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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20000026-CA

RUSSELL E. BISNER,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief. His
petition challenged his convictions for murder and aggravated robbery. This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court properly grant the State's motion for summary judgment?
Standard of Review. "In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, [this
Court] give[s] no deference to its conclusions of law," but "review[s] the grant of summary
judgment for correctness." Dick Simon Trucking, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com% 2004 UT
11, H 3,492 Utah Adv. Rep. 5. The Court '"review[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" Id. (quoting

Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 2002 UT 101, % 2, 57 P.3d 1067) (internal quotation omitted),
cert denied, 538 U.S 945, 123 S.Ct 1632 (2003).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1999)
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when
and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful
force. However, that person is justified in using force intended or likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably believes that
force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third
person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent
the commission of a forcible felony.
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances
specified in Subsection (1) if he or she:
(a) initially provokes the use of force against himself with the intent to
use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant;
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the
commission or attempted commission of a felony; or
(c) (i) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement,
unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to
the other person his intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the other person
continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force; and
(ii) for purposes of Subsection (i) the following do not, by themselves,
constitute "combat by agreement":
(A) voluntarily entering into or remaining in an ongoing
relationship; or
(B) entering or remaining in a place where one has a legal right to
be.
(3) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force or threatened
force described in Subsection (1) in a place where that person has lawfully
entered or remained, except as provided in Subsection (2)(c).
(4) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes aggravated
assault, mayhem, aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and
aggravated kidnapping, rape, forcible sodomy, rape of a child, object rape,
object rape of a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a
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child, and aggravated sexual assault as defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, and
arson, robbery, and burglary as defined in Title 76, Chapter 6. Any other
felony offense which involves the use offeree or violence against a person so
as to create a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury also
constitutes a forcible felony. Burglary of a vehicle, defined in Section 76-6204, does not constitute a forcible felony except when the vehicle is occupied
at the time unlawful entry is made or attempted.
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the
trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors:
(a) the nature of the danger;
(b) the immediacy of the danger;
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or
serious bodily injury;
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2002)
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground
that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for postconviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief
on a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on
appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of
counsel.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF FACTS 2

In the early morning hours of January 6, 1999 petitioner fatally shot Darby Golub
with an assault rifle as Darby attempted to flee to safety. R. 450: ^f 2.
Sometime between 9:00 and 10:30 the night before, petitioner and his friend Derek
Pearson visited Chris Lyman at his Sandy apartment to purchase LSD. R. 450: f 3. The two
visited Lyman for fifteen to twenty minutes. R. 450: f 3. During their conversation,
petitioner told Lyman that he was going to meet someone that night who owed him money.
R. 450: T[ 3. As the two left Lyman's apartment, petitioner declared, "Someone is going to
die tonight." R.450:^[3.
After leaving Lyman's apartment, the two went to the home of Justin Koontz where
other friends had gathered to party. R. 450: ^f 4. Justin's mother was working that evening at
a nearby 7-Eleven and his father was upstairs sleeping. R. 450-51: U 4. The friends partied
downstairs into the early morning hours of the next day, drinking alcohol and using drugs.
R. 451:^ 4 &n.3.
Petitioner had discussed with his friends a $350 drug debt Darby owed him. R. 451 :
5. From the party, petitioner telephoned Darby, leaving a message that he was supposed to
have paid on the drug debt that day. R. 451: ^f 5. At approximately 2:00 a.m., Darby
returned the call. R. 451: *| 6. Darby yelled at Justin because of a late call to his house and
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The Summary of Facts are taken, in most instances verbatim, from the trial court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law. See R. 450-57 (Addendum A).
4

Justin rejoined with a similar complaint. R. 451: <| 6. After speaking with Justin, Darby
spoke with Dustin Symes, another of petitioner's friends. R. 451: f 7. Darby again
complained of the late call to his house. R. 451: <f 7. He also threatened to kill petitioner and
his friends. R. 451: ^J 7. After an angry exchange of words, Darby agreed to meet petitioner
and his friends in the parking lot of the Canyon Center, a nearby shopping center, to settle
the dispute. R. 451: % 7 & n.4. Petitioner and his friends went expecting a fight. R. 451: ^ 7.
After hanging up, Dustin discussed the called with petitioner, Derek, and Justin, and
considered the possibility of taking guns. R. 452: % 8 & n.5. Anticipating a fight, the four
left in Dustin's truck to meet Darby at the Canyon Center parking lot. R. 452: <f 8. Finding
no one there, Dustin drove to the 7-Eleven located on the southeast corner of the parking lot
where Justin's mother was working that evening. R. 452: % 9. Petitioner, Dustin, and Derek
remained outside, talking with Justin's mother who was on break smoking a cigarette. R.
452: *H 9. Justin went inside, helped himself to the condiment bar, and spoke with another 7Eleven employee. R. 452: ^| 9.
After a few minutes at the 7-Eleven, the three friends outside saw Darby's truck pull
into in the Canyon Center parking lot just south of the middle businesses. See R. 452: *| 10.
Justin's mother went back into the convenience store and notified her son of Darby's arrival.
See R. 452: f 10. Extremely agitated and upset, Justin ran out of the store and joined his
friends in Dustin's truck. R. 452: ^ 11. As Justin exited the store, either he or his mother
exclaimed, "That chicken shit wouldn't show up." R. 452: f 11. After Justin left, his mother
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remarked to her co-worker, "I just sent him down to a fight at the Smith's. I guess that's not
a very good mother to send him down to do that." R. 452: ^[11.
Dustin parked his truck kitty-cornered to Darby's truck some twenty to thirty feet
away. R. 453: ^f 12. Darby, who was alone, exited his truck and stood with an assault rifle
cradled in his arms. R. 453: ^f 12. Petitioner and his friends exited their truck and quickly
advanced on Darby. R. 453: ^f 13. As Dustin described it, the four "walk[ed] extremely fast"
towards Darby. R. 453: ^ 1 3 . Although he had a rifle, Darby simply backed up as the four
advanced and made no threat with the weapon. R. 453: ^ 14. He did not fire the rifle nor did
he use it to otherwise defend himself. R. 453: f 14& n.6. Dustin, who brought with him an
aluminum baseball bat, thrust the bat at Darby, cutting his forehead, knocking him backward,
and causing him to drop the rifle. R. 453: ^ 15. Justin followed with a punch to Darby's leg.
R. 453: H 15.
Having disarmed Darby, Dustin returned to his truck and Justin followed. R. 453: ^
16. Confused, Darby asked, "Why are you doing this?" R. 453: ^f 16. Darby was eventually
forced to the ground as petitioner and Derek continued to beat on him for some thirty
seconds. R. 453: ^f 16. Dustin yelled for his friends to get back in the truck and all but
petitioner complied. R. 453: Tf 16.
Just as the three were climbing back into Dustin's truck, Darby lifted himself off the
ground, got into his truck, closed the door, and began speeding away through the parking lot.
R. 454: ^f 17. Based on the tire marks and the estimated speed of Darby's truck, the accident
reconstructionist opined that Darby "was rapidly trying to turn away from something or get
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away from something." R. 454: % 21. Meanwhile, petitioner picked up the rifle, cocked it,
and fired three successive rounds at Darby as he fled in his truck. R. 454: f 18. Although
the shots missed Darby, at least one round broke one of the truck's windows. See R. 454: f
18. The witnesses estimated that Darby was some one to three car lengths away when
petitioner fired the first series of shots. R. 454: f 19. An accident reconstructionist testified
that the shattered glass was about 65 feet from the first set of three shell casings found in the
parking lot. R. 454: If 19.
As Darby continued to speed away through the parking lot, petitioner fired another
three rounds. See R. 454: ^f 20. This time, one of the rounds grazed the driver's door,
pierced the window, and fatally struck Darby in the back of the head. See R. 454: <[| 20, R.
223: 455: <[ 23. The reconstructionist estimated Darby's truck to be traveling "about 39
miles an hour" at one point. R. 454: ^f 21. The reconstructionist testified that the second
location of shattered glass was approximately 145 feet from the shell casings found in the
parking lot. R. 454: *| 22. The medical examiner agreed that "this was not a close shooting."
R. 454: If 22.
After Darby was struck by the fatal bullet, his truck continued straight through the
parking lot towards the Rainbo gas station. R. 455: f 24. It ran over a parking island and
small tree, jumped over a curb and snow bank bordering the gas station, ran over a second
tree, and hit a concrete trash can, causing the truck to spin out of control before resting in the
Rainbo parking lot. R. 455: ^f 24. By the time witnesses reached the truck, Darby was dead,
slumped over onto the floor of the passenger side. R. 45 5: ^ 25. After petitioner shot Darby,
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Dustin drove away in his truck with Derek and Justin, while petitioner fled on foot through
an alleyway between the stores at the shopping center. R. 455: f 25.
Petitioner was taken into custody a few hours later at his home. R. 455: ]f 26. Once
petitioner was in custody, police searched the home where petitioner lived with his mother
and other family members. R. 455: ^f 26. Police found the assault rifle used to kill Darby
partially hidden behind clothing in an open closet underneath the stairs. R. 455: <[| 26.
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

Trial Proceedings. Petitioner was charged with murder and aggravated robbery, both
first degree felonies. R. 455: ^f 27. The trial court denied pretrial motions to quash the
bindover and to suppress evidence seized from petitioner's house. R. 456: <|fl[ 30-31. The
Utah Supreme Court denied a petition for interlocutory review of the order denying
petitioner's motion to suppress. R. 456: ^f 32.
Petitioner was thereafter tried by a jury. R. 450: ^j 1. After the State rested its case,
petitioner moved for a directed verdict, but that motion was denied. R. 456: f 33. The
defense rested without presenting evidence. R. 456: f 34. In his closing argument, defense
counsel conceded that petitioner shot the victim, Darby Golub, but asked the jury to find
petitioner guilty of only manslaughter, arguing that he was acting under an extreme
emotional disturbance. R. 456-57: ^f 34. The jury rejected the defense's theory of the case
and found petitioner guilty as charged. R. 457: If 35. They also found that petitioner had
used a dangerous weapon in the commission of the murder. R. 457: ^ 35. Petitioner
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unsuccessfully moved for an order merging the aggravated robbery conviction with the
murder conviction. R. 457: f 36.
The trial court sentenced petitioner to consecutive prison terms offive-years-to-life on
each count plus a consecutive one-year term for use of a firearm. R. 457: f 37. In
pronouncing sentence, the trial court remarked that it was particularly "tragic that the victim
here was trying to get away, that he sought to retreat, that he was in his truck speeding away
from the scene, trying to flee; yet you, in a cold and calculating way, continued to fire the
weapon multiple times [at] this victim under no threat of any kind whatsoever." R. 457: f
38.
Direct Appeal. Defendant appealed his convictions to the Utah Supreme Court,
raising five claims of error: (1) whether the prosecutor's seeming failure to disclose alleged
"cooperation agreements" with state witnesses violated petitioner's due process rights;
(2) whether the search of defendant's home violated his Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of the victim's drug debt to petitioner; (4) whether the manslaughter
instruction was correct; and (5) whether the trial court properly denied petitioner's motion to
merge his convictions for aggravated robbery and murder. R. 461-62: ^} 55-56,60-65; State
v. Eisner, 2001 UT 99, \ 30, 37 P.3d 1073. The Supreme Court rejected all five claims. R.
461-62: \\ 57-65; Eisner, 2001 UT 99.
Post-conviction Proceedings. Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Relief Under the
Post-conviction Remedies Act, alleging an unlawful search of his home and ineffective
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assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. R. 12-67. After review, the post-conviction
court ordered the State to file a responsive pleading. R. 107-08. In a Motion for Partial
Dismissal Without Prejudice and for Partial Summary Judgment, the State moved for an
order to (1) dismiss petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel as
procedurally barred; (2) dismiss without prejudice petitioner's claim that appellate counsel
should have challenged trial counsel's effectiveness for failing to investigate witnesses who
could have testified regarding petitioner's state of mind at the time of the crime; and (3) deny
petitioner's remaining claims on the merits as a matter of law. R. 113-14,129-45. The State
argued that petitioner's "state of mind" claim should be dismissed without prejudice because
petitioner had failed to allege sufficient facts to support it. R. 135-36. In response, petitioner
moved for leave to amend. R. 414-17. In a minute entry ruling, the post-conviction court
granted the State's summary judgment motion in all respects and ordered the State to prepare
an appropriate order. R. 425. Less than two weeks later, the court granted petitioner's
motion for leave to amend, giving him ten days to file the amended petition. R. 429.
Petitioner did not thereafter file an amended complaint. See 429-33. The court then entered
a final order dismissing without prejudice petitioner's "state of mind" claim and denying all
other claims. R. 449-69. Defendant timely appealed. R. 439.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the
ground that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. That claim is procedurally
barred because he could have raised that issue on appeal.
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel. Petitioner claims that his appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. Petitioner's claim fails because none of the issues that petitioner alleges should
have been raised were "dead-bang winners."
Petitioner did not dispute at trial that he fired the weapon that killed the victim.
Moreover, the evidence conclusively established that the victim was some 145 feet away
from petitioner, fleeing in his truck, when he was shot near the back of the head with the
fatal bullet. Therefore, even if a gunshot residue test had confirmed that the victim initially
fired the gun, petitioner still would not have succeeded on a theory of self-defense.
Petitioner's remaining ineffectiveness claims also fail—state witnesses were adequately
impeached, the jury was well aware that the fatal bullet was not a direct hit, and petitioner
was not entitled to access of all of the discovery.
Conflict of Interest. Petitioner also claims that a friendship between appellate counsel
and trial counsel created a conflict of interest. Petitioner failed to demonstrate any conflict.
Withholding of Evidence. Petitioner also claims that the prosecutor withheld material
evidence. This claim was not alleged below, and in any event, petitioner has not established
that the prosecutor withheld any information.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE STATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Petitioner challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing
petitioner's post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.
See Aplt. Brf.3 Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(c). A review of the trial court's ruling reveals that its grant of summary judgment
was correct.
A.

PETITIONER' S CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL
WAS PROCEDURALLY BARRED

In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner claimed that his trial counsel was
ineffective for a variety of reasons. R. 18-19. The post-conviction court dismissed this
claim as procedurally barred under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c) (2002). R.463. On
appeal, defendant challenges the dismissal of this claim and adds yet more grounds for
finding ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Aplt. Brf. at 6, 31-34 (alleging that he
"was denied the effective assistance of trial. . . counsel"). Petitioner's challenge fails.
Section 7 8-3 5 a-106 provides that a petitioner "is not eligible for relief under [the Act]
upon any ground t h a t . . . could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal." Utah
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Petitioner has not challenged the post-conviction denial of his claim that police
conducted an illegal search of his room. See Aplt. Brf. at 35-36 (stating that appellate
counsel's search and seizure claim "had no basis in law").
12

Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c) (2002). Petitioner's claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective could have been raised on direct appeal. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT76, fflf
9-17,12 P.3d 92 (observing that with the 1992 adoption of rule 23B, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, defendants have the procedural mechanism to raise any claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel). Therefore, the post-conviction court correctly concluded that
petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were procedurally barred. Cf.
Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, f 14, 44 P.3d 626 (holding that petitioner in habeas
proceeding—now superceded by Act—was procedurally barred from raising claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel because he could have raised them on direct appeal).
B.

PETITIONER' S CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE
COUNSEL FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW

In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner also claimed that his appellate
counsel was ineffective for not alleging on appeal that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to: (1) argue and present evidence of self-defense; (2) impeach State witnesses with
their plea agreements; (3) make known to the jury that the fatal bullet ricocheted off the truck
before striking the victim; and (4) provide petitioner with discovery and otherwise keep him
informed of the defense. R. 18-20. The post-conviction court correctly concluded that these
claims fail as a matter of law.4

Petitioner is not procedurally barred from raising ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-106(2) (providing that "a person may be eligible for
relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel").
13

To succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the test
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Petitioner must
show first, "'that his [or her] counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced [petitioner].'" Carter, 2001
UT 96, % 31 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994)) (brackets added in
Carter). In the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, petitioner
must establish that counsel "'omitt[ed] a "dead-bang winner" on appeal. Id. at f 48 (quoting
Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995)). A "dead-bang winner" is "an
'issue which is obvious from the trial record and one which probably would have resulted in
reversal on appeal.'" Id. (quoting Banks, 54 F.3d at 1515 n.13). The post-conviction court
correctly concluded that appellate counsel omitted no "dead-bang winners" on appeal.
1. An Appellate Claim that Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Not
Pursuing a Theory of Self-defense Was Not a "Dead-bang Winner."
The primary focus of petitioner's post-conviction claim is that appellate counsel was
ineffective for not challenging trial counsel's failure to pursue a theory of self-defense. On
appeal, petitioner claims that trial counsel should have: (1) produced the test results of a
purported gunshot residue test of the victim's hands; (2) called experts to testify about the
location of the shell casings at the scene; (3) emphasized that his friends had contusions on
their hands, that the dispute was over late telephone calls rather than a drug debt, and that his
friends were the first to attack the victim; and (4) introduced evidence of the victim's
propensity for violence and his aggressive and paranoid state of mind that evening, e.g., that
14

the victim was found with a 31-inch chain in his hand, was hyped up on drugs, and came
with a rifle. See Aplt. Brf. at 9, 12-16, 18, 24-29, 31-36.
Contrary to defendant's claim, most of this evidence was made known to the jury and
the victim's alleged behavior as the aggressor was forcefully argued to the jury. For
example, trial counsel argued in closing that it was Darby not defendant who threatened to
kill petitioner and his friends, that it was Darby who came with an assault rifle, that Darby
was "drug-crazed," and that the purpose of the meeting was never about a drug debt, but
about the late telephone calls. See R. 350-52 (Addendum B). Petitioner claims, however,
that his trial counsel should have argued self-defense because he had no intention of killing
Darby when he went to the parking lot that night and that Darby, not he, was the aggressor.
See Aplt Brf at 14-17, 20-21, 44.
Under the Utah Criminal Code, "[a] person is justified in threatening or using force
against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is
necessary to defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful
force." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) (1999). Deadly force may not be used unless the
person "reasonably believes that [such] force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily
injury to himself or a third person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force,
or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1).
Moreover, a person may not claim self-defense if he "was the aggressor or was engaged in a
combat by agreement, unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates
to the other person his intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the other person continues or
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threatens to continue the use of unlawful force." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(2)(c). A
review of the evidence reveals that defendant was not entitled to pursue a theory of selfdefense.
The evidence at trial was uncontested that after an angry exchange of words on the
telephone between the victim and petitioner's friends, petitioner and his friends agreed to
meet the victim to settle their dispute. R.451:^|7(R. 153-55, 160, 164, 166-67,175,179).5
Although petitioner alleges that the dispute was over the late telephone calls rather than a
drug debt, see Aplt. Brf. at 35-36, all agreed that they met Darby that night expecting a fight.
R. 452: *{ 8 (R. 154, 160, 166, 173-74, 176). The testimony was likewise undisputed that
Darby initially had a rifle, but that petitioner and his friends assaulted Darby and wrested it
away from him. R.453:ffl[ 12-15 (R. 154-57,161-65,168,177-78,181-82). Moreover, the
evidence at trial was uncontroverted that Darby was fleeing in his truck when he was fatally
shot. In addition to the testimony of petitioner's three friends, a 7-Eleven clerk who
witnessed the incident testified that Darby was shot as he was speeding away from the scene.
R. 187-88. The tire marks from Darby's truck confirmed that Darby'"was rapidly trying to
turn away from something or get away from something.'" R. 454: ^} 21 (quoting from R.
199). And finally, the evidence demonstrated that Darby was some 145 feet away from
petitioner when he was shot near the back of the head With the fatal bullet. R. 454: \ 22 (R.
201,215-16).

5

The record cites in parentheses refer to the trial transcripts included as exhibits in the
State's Motion for Partial Dismissal Without Prejudice and Partial Summary Judgment.
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Petitioner was the only other person known to have witnessed the shooting, but he did
not testify. He belatedly proffers on appeal a version of events that differs from the
testimony at trial, but only in insignificant respects that still do not support a theory of selfdefense. Petitioner asserts that after his friends ran back to the truck, he continued to
struggle with Darby over the gun and that during the struggle "the gun went off two or three
times." Aplt. Brf. at 22. Even had counsel introduced gunshot residue tests confirming that
Darby had fired the gun at this time, it would not have supported a theory of self-defense.
Only if Darby had been shot at that time would petitioner have been able to claim selfdefense or better under petitioner's facts.6 The evidence, however, established that Darby
was not shot at close range and petitioner acknowledges that Darby jumped into his truck
and drove off. R. 454: ^ 22; Aplt. Brf. at 22. He then admits that "as [Darby] started to drive
off [he] fired a couple of rounds" toward Darby. Aplt. Brf. at 22 (emphasis added).
A defendant is entitled to argue self-defense only if "there is a basis in the evidence,
whether the evidence is produced by the prosecution or by the defendant, which would
provide some reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that a killing was done to protect the
defendant from an imminent threat of death by another." State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211,214
(Utah 1985); accordUtzh Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) (1999). Thus, even under petitioner's
version of the facts—even had Darby been the initial aggressor and even had gunshot

6

In contrast to petitioner's claim on appeal, a 7-Eleven clerk who witnessed the
shooting testified that the first three shots were fired as the victim began to turn around some
islands in the parking lot and that the last three or four shots were fired after the victim had
completed his turn and gone some distance. R. 187-88.
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residue been found on Darby's hands—petitioner would not have been entitled to pursue a
theory of self-defense because he shot a retreating victim who posed no imminent threat to
him. See State v. Knotts, All S.E.2d 917, 924 (W.V. 1992) (holding that defendant not
entitled to self-defense instruction even if the victim initially stabbed him with a knife
because victim thereafter retreated and defendant pursued him and killed him).
And even if trial counsel had presented a theory of self-defense to the jury, it is not
reasonably likely to have resulted in a different outcome at trial. See, e.g., Mariscal v. State,
687 N.E.2d 378,381 (Ind. App. 1998) (jury properly found that defendant did not act in selfdefense where victim "was attempting to retreat at the time [defendant] attacked him with a
knife"); State v. Wilson, 613 So.2d 234, 239 (La. App. 1993) (jury properly rejected selfdefense claim where "fatal shot was fired at the victim [while he] was retreating into his
vehicle for safety);
* * *

In summary, an ineffectiveness claim based on trial counsel's failure to pursue a
theory of self-defense was not a "dead-bang winner." See Carter, 2001 UT 96, % 48. To the
contrary, such a claim would have been futile. The jury heard no evidence that would have
supported it and the evidence petitioner preferred in this proceeding still would not have
supported it. The post-conviction court thus correctly rejected petitioner's claim that
appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging trial counsel's failure to pursue and
present evidence of self-defense.
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2. An Appellate Claim that Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Not
Impeaching State Witnesses with Plea Agreements Was Not a
"Dead-bang Winner."
Petitioner also asserts that appellate counsel should have claimed that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to impeach State witnesses with the plea agreements they entered
with the State. This claim fails because petitioner's trial counsel did impeach the State's
witnesses and the impeachment value of any additional questioning about their plea
agreements would have been negligible.
Chris Lyman. Contrary to petitioner's claim, his trial counsel did impeach Chris
Lyman. On cross-examination, petitioner's trial counsel elicited admissions from Chris
Lyman that he served only two days of a ten-day jail sentence, and had a fine waived, in
exchange for his statement to police. R. 228-29, 231. He also elicited admissions from
Lyman that the investigating officer had told him the officer would not make an explicit deal
with him because "it would make it look like a deal was made for [Lyman] to talk," and it
would not appear to a jury that Lyman's statement was willingly given. R. 230-31.
Furthermore, in his closing argument, petitioner's counsel argued that Lyman was a "little
liar" who "made a deal to stay out of jail by giving some testimony," but is "still trying to
deny it." R. 351.
Derek Pearson and Justin Koontz. The jury was also aware of the State's plea
agreements with Derek Pearson and Justin Koontz. Pearson testified that although he was
charged with riot, a third degree felony, for his involvement in the murder, he pled guilty to
attempted riot, a class A misdemeanor and assault, a class B misdemeanor. R. 170-71.
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Likewise, Koontz testified that although he was originally charged with murder for his
involvement in the crimes, he pled guilty to attempted riot, a class a misdemeanor and
assault a class B misdemeanor. R. 179, 185. Koontz also testified at trial that although he
believed AP&P had recommended that he serve 18 months in jail, he only served 71 days.
R. 185.
While the jury was not expressly told that these pleas were part of a plea agreement,
the jury certainly made this inference. Moreover, because the jury was aware of the benefits
that Pearson and Koontz received for their statements, appellate counsel could not have
demonstrated that petitioner suffered any prejudice from trial counsel's handling of this
issue.
Dustin Symes. Dustin Symes testified at petitioner's preliminary hearing that "the
State had agreed to '[i]nform the court of my testimony and [that] I was cooperative'
following his appearance as a witness in [petitioner's] case." State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^f
40, 37 P.3d 1073. This specific agreement was not discussed at trial. However, Symes did
testify that he had been charged with aggravated assault, a felony, and that it was his
intention to plead guilty as charged. R. 159.
Although Symes apparently received some agreement from the State in exchange for
his testimony, and that agreement was not discussed at trial, petitioner could not demonstrate
that he suffered any prejudice as a result of his trial counsel's actions. Apparently the State
had not offered Symes a "plea deal" because he testified that his intention was to plead guilty
as charged. R. 890: 30-31. Therefore, any agreement that Symes had with the State lacked
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the impeachment value of the plea bargains offered to Pearson and Koontz. Moreover, even
after hearing evidence of the State's agreements with Lyman, Pearson, and Koontz, the jury
apparently still believed their testimony because they found petitioner guilty.
In any event, petitioner suffered no prejudice from any failure of trial counsel to
impeach Lyman, Symes, Pearson, and Koontz with additional evidence of their plea
agreements. As observed by the Utah Supreme Court on direct appeal, "the State introduced
overwhelming evidence at trial that [petitioner] killed [Darby] Golub intentionally or
knowingly." Bisner, 2001 UT 99, *[{ 64. Indeed, even without the testimony of these four
men, evidence from the 7-Eleven clerk, the accident reconstructionist, and the medical
examiner conclusively established that Darby was fleeing in his car, some 145 feet away
from petitioner, when petitioner shot Darby in the back of the head'with the fatal bullet. R.
454: % 22 (R. 201, 215-16). Thus, even had trial counsel further pressed the issue of the
men's plea agreements, no reasonable likelihood existed of a different result.
* * *

Because trial counsel effectively impeached Lyman, Pearson, and Koontz with the
benefits they had received for their testimony, and because the evidence was overwhelming
that petitioner shot Darby as he was fleeing, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang
winner" when he did not allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not challenging
trial counsel's failure to further impeach the men's testimony with their plea agreements.
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3. An Appellate Claim that Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Not
Making Known to the Jury that the Fatal Bullet Ricocheted Off the
Truck Before Striking the Victim Was Not a "Dead-bang Winner."
Petitioner also claims that his appellate counsel should have argued that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce expert testimony indicating that the fatal
bullet was not a direct hit, but ricocheted off of Darby's truck. This claim is frivolous
because the jury was made aware of that fact.
The medical examiner testified that the fatal bullet struck the truck's doorframe before
piercing Darby's skull. R. 214-17. The medical examiner recovered from Darby's skull
pieces of black plastic material consistent with the material on the truck's door frame. R.
214-16. The trial court also received into evidence State's Exhibit 22, a photograph showing
where the bullet had stuck the truck's doorframe. R. 217.
Because the jury heard this evidence, appellate counsel could not have prevailed on a
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce expert testimony of the same
fact.

Therefore, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winner" and the post-

conviction court correctly rejected the claim as a matter of law.
4. An Appellate Claim that Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing
to Provide Petitioner with Discovery Was Not a "Dead-bang
Winner."
In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner also claimed that appellate counsel
should have argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide him with the
discovery received from the State and for failing to keep him informed of the defense he was
preparing. R. 19. The post-conviction court denied that claim as a matter of law, R. 467,
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and petitioner does not appear to challenge that conclusion on appeal. Indeed, these were not
"dead-bang winner [s]" because petitioner's allegations concern matters of trial strategy that
ultimately fall within counsel's discretion.
"Trial counsel's decision whether to provide his client with discovery materials
constitutes a matter of trial strategy and judgment that ultimately lies within counsel's
discretion." People v. Davison, 686 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (111. App. Ct. 1997). Trial counsel
may believe that it is not helpful to allow a defendant access to discovery materials for
several reasons. Id. For example, "[a]n unknowledgeable client may put great weight upon
or become distracted by discrepancies in the discovery that counsel understands are trivial or
of no import to the defense." Id. Furthermore, a defendant who challenges his counsel's
strategic decisions based upon the defendant's reading of discovery materials "might disrupt
counsel's management of the case and undermine the attorney-client relationship." Id.
Providing discovery materials to a defendant might also interfere with counsel's ability to
understand the defendant's version of events. Id. "The defendant could become fixated on
what the State's witnesses say happened, making it more difficult for counsel to get
defendant focused on those matters that counsel knows—due to his or her vastly greater
training and experience—are important to the case." Id.
Likewise, the decision of which defense to present is a matter of trial strategy. For
example, in State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 556-57 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the defendant
argued that his counsel was ineffective for formulating a defense theory and then abandoning
that theory mid-trial. The Utah Court of Appeals recognized, however, that "[t]he change in
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defense appears to be nothing more than a change in strategy." Id. Moreover, the court held
that "any election between inconsistent defenses was a legitimate exercise of trial strategy
rather than ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. (citing State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217,
219 (Utah CtApp. 1988)).
A reviewing court "will not second-guess a trial attorney's legitimate use of judgment
as to trial tactics or strategy." State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 15 (Utah App. 1988) (citations
omitted). Petitioner's allegations regarding counsel's alleged failure to provide him copies
of discovery, and to keep him informed of the defense he was preparing, concern matters of
trial strategy. Therefore, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winner" on appeal
with respect to these allegations.
In any event, appellate counsel could not have demonstrated that petitioner suffered
any prejudice as a result of trial counsel's actions. To have established prejudice, appellate
counsel would have had to demonstrate that had trial counsel performed differently, there
was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
See Carter, 2001 UT 9 6 4 31 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Apparently,petitioner's
complaints with his counsel's failure to provide him copies of discovery, and to keep him
informed of the defense he was preparing, concern petitioner's complaint that counsel should
have pursued a self-defense theory at trial. As discussed above, the facts of petitioner's
crime did not support a self-defense theory. Moreover, petitioner fails to allege any other
facts or theory that would demonstrate how the outcome of his trial would have been
different had his counsel provided him with discovery or kept him informed of the defense
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he was preparing. Consequently, these claims were not "dead-bang winners" and the postconviction court thus correctly denied petitioner's claims as a matter of law.
C.

PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT APPELLATE
COUNSEL HAD A CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Petitioner also claims that his appellate counsel had a conflict of interest because they
were recommended by trial counsel. Aplt. Brf. at 6, 33-39. Petitioner points only to trial
counsel's motion to withdraw, which recommended the appointment of his eventual
appellate attorneys, as evidence of a conflict. Aplt. Brf. at 15, 30. That motion established
no such conflict. Contrary to petitioner's claim, the motion did not establish a friendship or
conflict between trial counsel and appellate counsel. The motion simply recommended the
appointment of attorneys that were competent to represent petitioner on appeal. This claim
thus fails.
D.

PETITIONER HAS N O T DEMONSTRATED THAT THE PROSECUTOR
WITHHELD EVIDENCE

Petitioner also alleges on appeal that the prosecutor did not disclose exculpatory
material to the defense, and in particular, a purported gunshot residue test on the victim's
hands which he claims revealed that the victim had fired a gun. Aplt. Brf. at 7-21. In the
first place, he has produced nothing that indicates the test result was positive. His claim that
the purported test was positive is thus pure conjecture. In the second place, as discussed
above, even a positive test result would not have supported a claim of self-defense. And
finally, an alleged failure by the prosecutor to disclose material evidence was not claimed in
the petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, he cannot raise that claim as a ground

25

for reversal on appeal. See Hanover Ltd. v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1977) (holding
that issues "issues not raised in the pleadings nor presented at trial.. . cannot be considered
for the first time on appeal").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the trial
court's order granting partial dismissal and partial summary judgment, advent
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IN THE THRID JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RUSSELL BISNER,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER ON PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Case No. 020911933

Respondent.

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

This matter came before the Court on the State's motion for partial dismissal without
prejudice and for partial summary judgment. The Court has reviewed the petition, the State's
motion and supporting memorandum, the petitioner's opposition in the form of a motion for leave to
file an amended complaint, and the State's reply memorandum. Now being fully advised in the
premises, the Court makes the following findings of undisputed fact, conclusions of law, and enters
the following order granting the State's motion.

FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACT
The Crimes
1. Petitioner was convicted of murder and aggravated robbery following a jury trial.
Minutes Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, attached as Exhibit A.1 The State presented the
following evidence at petitioner's trial:
2. In the early morning hours of 6 January 1999 petitioner fatally shot Darby Golub with an
assault rifle as Darby attempted to flee to safety. R. 890: 145-46, 159 (Trial Transcript Vol. I),
attached as Exhibit B; R. 891: 183, 201, 245-47, 251-60,269-70 (Trial Transcript Vol. II), attached
as Exhibit C.
3. Sometime between 9:00 and 10:30 the night before, petitioner and his friend Derek
Pearson visited Chris Lyman at his Sandy apartment to purchase LSD. R. 889: 3-4, 21 (Partial Trial
Transcript: Testimony of Christopher Bruce Lyman), attached as Exhibit D. The two visited Lyman
for fifteen to twenty minutes. R. 889: 4-5, 22. During their conversation, petitioner told Lyman that
he was going to meet someone that night who owed him money. R. 889: 05. As the two left
Lyman's apartment, petitioner declared, "Someone is going to die tonight." R. 889: 5; see also R.
889: 22-24.
4. After leaving Lyman's apartment, the two went to the home of Justin Koontz where other
friends had gathered to party. See R. 890: 56-57; see also R. 890: 4-5, 93-94. Justin's mother was
1

The exhibits referred to are attached to the State's memorandum supporting its motion.

2

References to transcripts are to the record as paginated for appeal. For example, R. 890
refers to trial record page 890, which is volume one of the trial transcript. The numbers following
the colon refer to the specific pages of the transcript. Therefore, the citation "R. 890: 145-46," refers
to pages 145-46 of volume one of the trial transcript.
2

working that evening at a nearby 7-Eleven and his father was upstairs sleeping. R. 890: 10-11, 1415, 94, 99. The friends partied downstairs into the early morning hours of the next day, drinking
alcohol and using drugs. R. 890: 5-6,10, 57, 94,113-14.3
5. Petitioner had discussed with his friends a $350 drug debt Darby owed him. See R. 890:
8-9, 58-59. From the party, petitioner telephoned Darby and left a message that he was supposed to
have paid the drug debt that day. R. 890: 58-59.
6. Darby returned the call at approximately 2:00 a.m. R. 890: 6, 9-10, 94-96. Darby yelled
at Justin because of a late call to his house and Justin rejoined with a similar complaint. R. 890: 95,
112.
7. After speaking with Justin, Darby spoke with Dustin Symes, another of petitioner's
friends. R. 890: 4-6, 34, 58-59, 94. Darby again complained of the late call to his house. R. 890: 78. He also threatened to kill petitioner and his friends. R. 890: 7-8, 35, 88-89. After the angry
exchange, Darby agreed to meet petitioner and his friends in the parking lot of the Canyon Center, a
nearby shopping center, to settle the dispute. R. 890: 13-14, 34-35, 51, 60-61.4 Petitioner and his
friends went expecting a fight. R. 890: 12, 36, 60, 88-89.

Derek Pearson, who had accompanied petitioner to Lyman's house, testified that he had
been smoking marijuana most of the night and that he took six "hits" of LSD at approximately 11:00
that evening. R. 890: 57, 79. Justin Koontz also acknowledged at trial that he had smoked
marijuana that evening. R. 890: 114.
4

The Canyon Center, similar to a strip mall, includes a Smith's grocery store on the west
end, a Shopko at the east end, and a variety of smaller businesses in between. A large parking lot lay
to the south of the businesses. R. 890: 13-14, 36,162,168. A Rainbo Mart and a 7-Eleven sit on the
southern-most borders of the Canyon Center parking lot, facing 9400 South—the Rainbo gas station
sits directly south of the middle businesses and the 7-Eleven sits in the southeast corner. R. 890: 14,
146, 163; R. 891: 176. Witnesses referred to the parking lot as either the Shopko or the Smith's
parking lot. SeeR. 890: 8,13-14, 36, 61, 64, 97,100,114,140-41; R. 891: 175.
3

8. After hanging up, Dustin discussed the called with petitioner, Derek, and Justin, and
considered the possibility of taking guns. R. 890: 9-10, 35-36, 60-62, 78.5 Anticipating a fight, the
four left in Dustin's truck to meet Darby at the Canyon Center parking lot. R. 890: 8-12, 36, 39, 53,
61-62, 98.
9. Finding no one there, Dustin drove to the 7-Eleven located on the southeast corner of the
parking lot where Justin's mother was working that evening. R. 890: 13-14, 61-62, 99. Petitioner,
Dustin, and Derek remained outside, talking with Justin's mother who was on break smoking a
cigarette. R. 890: 14, 37, 62-63, 78-79,138-39,152. Justin went inside, helped himself to the
condiment bar, and spoke with another 7-Eleven employee. R. 890: 15, 63, 78, 99, 137-38,152.
10. After a few minutes at the 7-Eleven, the three friends outside saw Darby's truck pull into
in the Canyon Center parking lot just south of the middle businesses. See R. 890: 14-16, 37-39, 6364, 73-74, 99,139. Justin's mother went back into the convenience store and notified her son of
Darby's arrival. See R. 890: 140.
11. Extremely agitated and upset, Justin ran out of the store and joined his friends in
Dustin's truck. R. 890: 17, 64, 99-100. As Justin exited the store, either he or his mother exclaimed,
"That chicken shit wouldn't show up." R. 890: 140, 153. After Justin left, his mother remarked to
her co-worker, "I just sent him down to a fight at the Smith's. I guess that's not a very good mother
to send him down to do that." R. 890: 140.

Although both Dustin and Justin denied any talk of weapons, R. 890: 43, 98, 115, Derek
testified they did have that discussion. R. 890: 60, 62, 78.
4

12. Dustin parked his truck kitty-comer to Darby's truck some twenty to thirty feet away. R.
890: 17-18, 38, 64-65,100-01, 116, 141-42,154. Darby, who was alone, exited his truck and stood
with an assault rifle cradled in his arms. R. 890: 19-21, 38-39,41, 54, 65,101-02.
13. Petitioner and his friends exited their truck and quickly advanced on Darby. R. 890: 1823, 66-68,102-05. As Dustin described it, the four "walk[ed] extremely fast" towards Darby. R.
890: 20-21.
14. Although he had a rifle, Darby simply backed up as the four advanced and made no
threat with the weapon. R. 890: 103.6 He did not fire the rifle nor did he use it to otherwise defend
himself. R. 890: 21, 66-68, 90, 105.
15. Dustin, who brought with him an aluminum baseball bat, thrust the bat at Darby, cutting
his forehead, knocking him backward, and causing him to drop the rifle. R. 890: 12-13, 21-23, 4344,46, 54-55, 68,103-04. Justin followed with a punch to Darby's leg. R. 890: 104-05.
16. Having disarmed Darby, Dustin returned to his truck and Justin followed. R. 890: 23-24,
44-45, 105, 120-22. Confused, Darby asked, "Why are you doing this?" R. 890: 69, 83. Darby was
eventually forced to the ground as petitioner and Derek continued to beat him for some thirty
seconds. R. 890: 22-24, 44-45, 66-68, 83,104-05, 143. Dustin yelled for his friends to get back in
the truck and all but petitioner complied. R. 890: 24-25, 47, 69, 84,105-06, 121.
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Dustin Symes testified that he never saw Darby point the gun at them, R. 890: 19-20, 3839,41, 54, and Justin Koontz testified that he didn't remember Darby pointing the gun at them. But
see R. 890: 102 (claiming Darby was waiving the gun). Only Derek Pearson, who acknowledged he
was high on alcohol and drugs, testified that Darby pointed the gun at them. R. 890: 65-66, 82.
5

17. Just as the three were climbing back into Dustin's truck, Darby lifted himself off the
ground, got into his truck, closed the door, and began speeding away through the parking lot. R.
890:144,157.
18. Meanwhile, petitioner picked up the rifle, cocked it, and fired three successive rounds at
Darby as he fled in his truck. R. 890: 25-27, 70-71, 106-08, 123, 128-29. Although the shots missed
Darby, at least one round broke one of the track's windows. See R. 890: 27; R. 891: 185, 196-97,
252.
19. The witnesses estimated that Darby was some one to three car lengths away when
petitioner fired the first series of shots. R. 890: 27, 50, 54,144,158. An accident reconstructionist
testified that the shattered glass was about 65 feet from the first set of three shell casings found in the
parking lot. R. 891: 185,192.
20. As Darby continued to speed away through the parking lot, petitioner fired another three
rounds. See R. 890: 145,159; R. 891: 183,192, 197. This time, one of the rounds grazed the
driver's door, pierced the window, and fatally struck Darby in the back of the head. See R. 890:
145-46,159; R. 891: 183, 201, 245-47, 251-60, 269-70.
21. Based on the tire marks and the estimated speed of Darby's truck, the accident
reconstructionist opined that Darby "was rapidly trying to turn away from something or get away
from something." R. 891: 186. The reconstructionist estimated Darby's truck to be traveling "about
39 miles an hour" at one point. Id.
22. The reconstructionist testified that the second location of shattered glass was
approximately 145 feet from the shell casings found in the parking lot. R. 891: 192. The medical
examiner agreed that "this was not a close shooting." R. 891: 251.
6

23. The medical examiner testified that the fatal bullet had struck the truck's doorframe
before piercing Darby's skull. R. 891: 246,250, 253-56. The medical examiner recovered from
Darby's skull pieces of black plastic material consistent with the material on the truck's door frame.
R. 891: 246,250, 254. The trial court also received into evidence State's Exhibit 22, a photograph
showing where the bullet had stuck the truck's doorframe. R. 891: 255-56.
24. After Darby was struck by the fatal bullet, his truck continued straight through the
parking lot towards the Rainbo gas station. It ran over a parking island and small tree, jumped over
a curb and snowbank bordering the gas station, ran over a second tree, and hit a concrete trash can,
causing the truck to spin out of control before resting in the Rainbo parking lot. R. 890: 27-28, 72,
146,148; R. 891: 180-81,183.
25. By the time witnesses reached the track, Darby was dead, slumped over onto the floor of
the passenger side. R. 890: 148-49,164-65. After petitioner shot Darby, Dustin drove away in his
truck with Derek and Justin, while petitioner fled on foot through an alleyway between the stores at
the shopping center. R. 890: 28, 48, 72,109.
26. Petitioner was taken into custody a few hours later at his home. R. 891: 215. Once
petitioner was in custody, police searched the home where petitioner lived with his mother and other
family members. R. 891: 204-05. Police found the assault rifle used to kill Darby partially hidden
behind clothing in an open closet underneath the stairs. R. 891: 206-12.
27. The State charged petitioner with murder and aggravated robbery, both first degree
felonies. Information, attached as Exhibit E.
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28. Petitioner was represented at trial by Ralph Dellapiana and Matthew Nielsen of the Salt
Lake Legal Defender's Association. Minutes, Jury Trial, dated 24 August 1999, attached as Exhibit
F.
29. There is no evidence in the record that a gun-shot residue (GSR) test was performed on
the victim.
Relevant Procedural History
30. Petitioner filed motions to quash the bindover and to suppress evidence seized from his
house, including the murder weapon. Motion to Quash Bindover, attached as Exhibit G; Motion to
Suppress Evidence and Supporting Memorandum, attached as Exhbit H.
31. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied both motions. Minutes, Law
& Motion dated 17 May 1999, attached as Exhibit I; Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law,
attached as Exhibit J.
32. Petitioner filed a petition for interlocutory review of the order denying his motion to
suppress, which the Utah Supreme Court denied. Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory
Order, attached as Exhibit K; Order from Utah Supreme Court dated 18 August 1999, attached as
Exhibit L.
33. Petitioner unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict after the State rested. Minutes,
Jury Trial, dated 25 August 1999, attached as Exhibit M; R. 891: 283.
34. The defense rested without presenting evidence. Exhibit M at 2; R. 891: 287-88. In his
closing argument, petitioner's counsel conceded that petitioner was the one who shot Darby, but
argued that petitioner acted under an extreme emotional disturbance and was therefore only guilty of
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manslaughter. R. 894: 32-33 (Partial Trial Transcript: Motion in Limine / Openings, Closings &
Exceptions), attached as Exhibit Q.
35. The jury found petitioner guilty on both counts and further found that a dangerous
weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the murder. Exhibit A; Minutes, Jury Trial,
Notice, dated 26 August 1999, attached as Exhibit N.
36. Nineteen days after the verdict, but before sentencing, petitioner unsuccessfully moved
to merge the aggravated robbery conviction with the murder conviction. Motion to Arrest Judgment,
attached as Exhibit O; Exhibit A at 2; R. 895: 3-8 (Sentencing Transcript), attached as Exhibit P.
37. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced petitioner to consecutive prison terms of five-yearsto-life on each count plus an additional one-year term for use of a firearm. Exhibit A; R. 895: 26-27.
38. In pronouncing sentence the trial court remarked, "In particular, it seems to me it's tragic
that the victim here was trying to get away, that he sought to retreat, that he was in his truck
speeding away from the scene, trying to flee; yet you, in a cold and calculating way, continued to
fire the weapon multiple times after this victim under no threat of any kind whatsoever." R. 895: 2627.
The Alleged "Cooperation Agreements "
39. Christopher Lyman. On cross-examination, petitioner's counsel asked Lyman if he
had made any agreement with the State in exchange for his testimony. R. 889: 6. Lyman responded
"No, I was not given immunity or any kind of written statement... that I would not be prosecuted."
R. 889: 6-7. He also explained, "they could not promise but they told me they wouldn't be
prosecuting me." R. 889: 7.
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40. When asked whether he had discussed "getting out of some jail time" if he would give a
statement, Lyman responded, "In a sense, yes." R. 889: 8-9. Lyman explained that at the time he
gave his statement to police, he was facing a jail sentence often days and that he ended up serving
only two days. R. 889:10-11. A fine was also waived. R. 889: 18-19. Nevertheless, there was
never any agreement to reduce his jail time in exchange for his statement. R. 889: 11-12.
41. Petitioner's counsel was able to elicit, however, Lyman's acknowledgement that the
investigating officer had told him the officer would not make an explicit deal because "it would
make it look like a deal was made for [Lyman] to talk," and it would not appear to a jury that
Lyman's statement was willingly given. R. 889: 15-17.
42. Petitioner's counsel also suggested that the prosecution had agreed that in exchange for
Lyman's testimony it would not prosecute Lyman for his admitted drug dealings with petitioner. R.
891: 279-80. The prosecutor explained, however, that no such deal was ever made. R. 891: 282-83.
Rather, the State simply told Lyman that it could not prosecute him for his admitted drug distribution
because the only evidence it had of the crime was Lyman's admission, and his admission alone was
insufficient to support a prosecution on drug distribution charges. R. 891: 282-83.
43. In his closing argument, petitioner's counsel argued that Lyman was a "little liar" who
"made a deal to stay out of jail by giving some testimony," but is "still trying to deny it." R. 894: 38
(Partial Trial Transcript of Motion in Limine / Openings, Closings & Exceptions), attached as
Exhibit Q. Petitioner's counsel argued that the jury should completely disregard Lyman's testimony
because he had lied about his alleged deal with the prosecution. R. 894: 38-40.
44. Derek Pearson & Justin Koontz. In a sworn affidavit, the prosecutor stated that prior
to trial he had told petitioner's counsel that "both Derek Pearson and Justin Koontz had pled guilty
10

to one count of attempted riot, a class A misdemeanor and one count of assault, a class B
misdemeanor, reduced from the original charge of riot, a third degree felony, and that they were
expected to testify truthfully for the State." Affidavit of Robert L. Stott, attached as Exhibit R.
45. During trial, Pearson testified that although he was charged with riot, a third degree
felony, for his involvement in the murder he pled guilty to attempted riot, a class A misdemeanor,
and assault, a class B misdemeanor. R. 890: 76-77.
46. During trial, Koontz similarly testified that although he was originally charged with
murder for his involvement in the crimes he pled guilty to attempted riot, a class A misdemeanor,
and assault a class B misdemeanor. R. 890: 109-10,134-35.
47. Koontz also testified at trial that although he believed AP&P had recommended that he
serve 18 months in jail, he only served 71 days. R. 890: 135.
48. Dustin Symes. At petitioner's preliminary hearing, Symes "testified that the State had
agreed to '[i]nform the court of my testimony and [that] I was cooperative' following his appearance
as a witness in [petitioner's] case." State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99,140, 37 P.3d 1073, attached as
Exhibit S.
49. This specific agreement was not discussed at trial. Symes did testify, however, that he
had been charged with aggravated assault, a felony, and that it was his intention to plead guilty as
charged. R. 890: 30-31.
50. Specific Procedural History. Prior to trial, petitioner filed a motion to exclude
testimony from any State witnesses with whom the State made any undisclosed "agreements,
inducements, offers of leniency, or other understandings" for their cooperation or testimony. Motion
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to Exclude Testimony of Certain Witnesses, attached as Exhibit T. The trial court did not
immediately rule on the motion to strike.
51. In conjunction with his motion for a directed verdict following the State's evidence,
petitioner also argued that the testimony of Chris Lyman, a State witness, should be stricken because
the State did not disclose an alleged "cooperation agreement" with Lyman. Exhibit M at 2; R. 89]:
278-83. That motion was denied. Exhibit M at 2; R. 891: 283-85.
52. Petitioner timely moved for a new trial, renewing his argument that the State did not
disclose the alleged "cooperation agreement" with Chris Lyman. Motion for New Trial and
Supporting Memorandum, attached as Exhibit U. The trial court denied the motion. Minute Entry
Ruling, dated 23 November 1999, attached as Exhibit V; Order Denying Defendant's Motion for
New Trial, attached as Exhibit W.
53. After the trial court announced its decision denying the motion, but before it entered a
final written order, petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion for a new trial.
Motion for Reconsideration of Motion for New Trial, and Supporting Memorandum, attached as
Exhibit X. That motion was never decided by the trial court and petitioner timely filed a notice of
appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial. Notice of Appeal, attached as Exhibit Y.
54. In an effort to obtain a ruling on his motion to reconsider, petitioner moved to dismiss
the appeal without prejudice pending disposition of his motion to reconsider. This Court denied the
motion, holding that a motion to reconsider is not valid under the rules and that "[t]he trial court
lacks jurisdiction to consider anything further in this case because petitioner timely filed his notice
of appeal." Order from Utah Supreme Court dated 31 August 2000, attached as Exhibit Z.
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The Appeal
55. Petitioner appealed his conviction, raising five claims of error. State v. Bisner, 2001 UT
99, f 30, 37 P.3d 1073, attached as Exhibit S. He was represented on appeal by Richard Mauro and
Michael Sikora. Id. at 1076
56. Petitioner first claimed that "the trial court erred by refusing to grant a new trial, since
the State violated [petitioner's] due process rights by failing to disclose its alleged cooperation
agreements with Koontz, Lyman, Pearson, and Symes." Id. at f 30.
57. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this claim. With respect to Lyman, the Court held that
"the defense knew days before trial about the State's alleged agreement to reduce the jail sentence
and fine imposed in Lyman's unrelated misdemeanor in exchange for his testimony in [petitioner's]
trial." Id. at f 37. Moreover, the Court held that "[petitioner's] attorney was able to used this
information extensively at trial in an attempt to impeach Lyman's testimony." Id.
58. With regard to the alleged agreement not to prosecute Lyman for drug distribution, the
Court held that the defense "was afforded a full opportunity" to question Lyman regarding the
alleged deal but failed to do so. Id. at f 38. Therefore, the was no violation of petitioner's rights
with regard to any alleged failure to disclose agreements with Lyman. Id. at Iff 37-38.
59. Likewise, regarding the alleged failure to disclose agreements with Koontz, Pearson, and
Symes, the Court held that petitioner's rights were not violated because his counsel was aware of
any agreements and had the opportunity to question the witnesses at trial regarding the agreements.
Id. at f 40. Furthermore, the Court observed that both Koontz and Pearson testified at trial regarding
the agreements. Id.
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60. Petitioner's second contention on appeal was "that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the evidence removed from his living quarters in his mother's basement, namely,
the assault rifle used to kill Golub." Id, at f 41.
61. The Court rejected this claim, holding that petitioner's mother voluntary consented to 1he
warrantless searches of her home and therefore "the trial court did not err in denying his motion to
suppress the evidence seized from his living quarters in his mother's basement." Id, atffif52-53.
62. Petitioner's third contention on appeal was "that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to exclude evidence of the drug debt Golub owned him." Id, at Tf 54. The Court rejected this
claim, holding that the evidence was admissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence because
it was relevant as to petitioner's motive and intent, and its probative value was not substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Id, at Tffl 56-59.
63. Petitioner's fourth contention on appeal was that the trial court erroneously instructed the
jury regarding manslaughter. Id, at f 60. The Court noted, however, that it had previously upheld an
identical manslaughter instruction and therefore rejected petitioner's claim. Id, at f 61.
64. Petitioner's fifth contention on appeal was that the trial court erred in refusing to merge
his convictions for aggravated robbery and murder. Id. at f 62. The Court rejected this claim,
holding that under the facts of this case the two crimes did not merge. Id. at f 63-65.
65. The Utah Supreme Court also observed that "the State introduced overwhelming
evidence at trial that [petitioner] killed Golub intentionally or knowingly." Id, at 64. The Court then
went on to detail the supporting evidence, including evidence that petitioner shot Darby as he was
"speeding away" in his truck. Id,
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The Post-Conviction Petition
66. Petitioner claims he is entitled to post-conviction relief on the following grounds:
a. His trial counsel was ineffective because he:
1. failed to investigate witnesses that would have testified as to P's state of
mind at the time of the crime;
2. refused to argue that the crime was committed in "self-defense";
3. failed to investigate and impeach the state's witnesses by mentioning the
plea agreements they had entered;
4. failed to argue to the jury that the bullet that struck the victim ricocheted
off the truck and was not a direct hit;
5. failed to call expert witnesses to testify about the results of gun-shot
residue tests on the victim's hands;
6. failed to call experts to testify regarding the victim's state of mind;
7. failed to provide petitioner with the discovery he received from the State
and failed to keep petitioner informed of the defense he was preparing;
b. The police conducted an illegal search of his room; and
c. Appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise, on appeal, the above
allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Petition at 7-9.
67. Petitioner fails to specifically identify any additional witnesses defense counsel should
have called or proffer what their testimony would have been.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. All of petitioner's claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel are procedurally
barred because petitioner could have raised them on direct appeal. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a106(l)(c).
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2. Petitioner's claim alleging that the search of his bedroom was illegal is procedurally
barred because it was already litigated both at trial and on direct appeal. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 7835a-106(l)(b).
3. Petitioner alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise, on appeal,
his allegations of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. To demonstrate that his appellate counsel was
ineffective, petitioner must show that his counsel overlooked a "dead-bang winning" claim, in other
words, a claim that was 1) obvious from the record; and 2) probably would have resulted in reversal
See Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, f48,44 P.3d 636 (citing Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515
(10th Cir. 1995)). Each of petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fail as a
matter of law except for his first claim, which is inadequately pled.
a. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate witnesses who would
have testified as to petitioner's state of mind. This claim is inadequately pled because petitioner
fails to specifically allege which additional witnesses his trial counsel should have called and proffer
what their testimony would have been. Therefore, this claim should be dismissed without prejudice
and with leave to amend.
b. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's failure to argue that petitioner acted in selfdefense. The undisputed facts at trial conclusively refuted any claim that petitioner acted in selfdefense. Petitioner would not have been entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense. Therefore,
appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winning" ineffectiveness claim by omitting this issue.
c. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate and impeach the
State's witnesses with their plea agreements. Trial counsel impeached Christopher Lyman with
his plea agreement and argued that he was a liar who had tried to conceal the agreement. The jury
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was also aware of the State's plea agreements with Derek Pearson and Justin Koontz. Therefore,
appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winning" argument with respect to trial counsel's
questioning of these witnesses.
The State apparently agreed to inform the court handling Dustin Symes' trial that he was
cooperative and had testified in petitioner's trial. Symes' agreement was not discussed at
petitioner's trial. Nevertheless, 1) Symes' agreement lacked the impeachment value of the other
witness's agreements because the State had not agreed to reduce his charges; 2) the jury was aware
of the other witness's plea agreements and still chose to believe their testimony, and 3) the State
produced overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt. Therefore, appellate counsel did not overlook
any "dead-bang winning" argument with respect to trial counsel's questioning of Symes.
d. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's alleged failure to argued that the fatal bullet had
ricocheted. The medical examiner testified that the fatal bullet struck the truck's doorframe before
piercing Darby's skull and State's Exhibit 22 was a photograph showing where the bullet struck the
truck's doorframe before hitting Darby. Because the jury heard evidence that the fatal bullet had
ricocheted, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winning" claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for allegedly failing to present this evidence.
e. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's failure to present evidence of gun-shot residue tests
on the victim's hands. There is no evidence in the record that a gun-shot residue (GSR) test was
performed on the victim's hands. Petitioner's belief that a test was performed apparently stems from
his misinterpretation of the transcript of his police interrogation. Petitioner has not provided the
Court with a copy of the transcript and no copy appears in the record. According to petitioner, the
interrogating officer allegedly stated, "The GSR kit says that it went off in your hand. It's all over
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actually. It's on both your hands." Clearly the officer refers to both ofpetitioner's hands, rather
than to petitioner's and Darby's hands. Because petitioner's claim has no basis in fact appellate
counsel was not ineffective for omitting it.
In any event, even if a GSR test indicated that Darby had fired some weapon at some time,
there was still no evidence to support a theory that petitioner acted in self-defense. The undisputed
evidence at trial established that Darby was unarmed and fleeing in his truck when petitioner shot
him. Therefore, even if such GSR test results existed, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang
winning' claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce the evidence at trial.
f. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's failure to call experts to testify regarding the
victim's state of mind. Evidence of the victim's state of mind would have been inadmissible
hearsay. See state v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1964) (citing State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935, 937
(Utah 1988)). It would have also been irrelevant because there was no evidence that the killing was
a suicide, a result of self-defense, or an accident to which the victim contributed by acting as an
aggressor. See id. Appellate counsel was unlikely to succeed on a claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to introduce inadmissible, irrelevant evidence.
In any event, the jury heard evidence that Darby was angry, had threatened to kill petitioner
and his friends, and that petitioner and his friends were expecting a fight when they met Darby.
Therefore, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winning" argument with respect to this
claim because counsel could not have demonstrated that petitioner was prejudiced by trial counsel's
performance.
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g. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's alleged failure to provide petitioner with discovery
and keep him informed of the defense. Trial counsel's decisions regarding whether to provide his
client with discovery and which defense to present are matters of trial strategy that ultimately fall
within counsel's discretion. See People v. Davidson, 686 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (111. App. Ct. 1997)
(discovery); State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 556-57 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (choice of defense).
Therefore, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winning" ineffectiveness claim with respect
to these allegations.
Even if these were not matters of strategy, appellate counsel could not have demonstrated
that petitioner suffered any prejudice as a result of trial counsel's actions. Petitioner contends that
the failure to provide him with discovery and to keep him informed of the defense deprived him of
the opportunity to assert a claim of self-defense. However, the undisputed facts presented at trial
conclusively refuted any claim of self-defense. Therefore, appellate counsel overlooked no "deadbang winning" argument with respect to these claims.

Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions the Court enters the following:
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ORDER
1. The State's motion for partial dismissal without prejudice and for partial summary
judgment is GRANTED.
2. Petitioner's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for neglecting to raise, on appeal,
trial counsel's alleged failure to call witnesses who would have testified regarding petitioner's state
of mind is DISMISSED without prejudice.
3. Petitioner's remaining claims are DENIED.
DATED this

1/h

day of-:

'2003.

BYT

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Russell Bisner
ProSe
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on yC

July 2003 I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing

proposed FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER ON
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, to:
Russell Bisner, #29334
Central Utah Correctional Facility
Aspen 220 Bottom
PO BOX 550
Gunnison, UT 84634

^4^/^^^c/

21

Addendum B

Addendum B

I

Page 25
1 standpoint of the defendant at that particular time but
1 it was like a spray can, someone had sprayed it w ith
2 a reasonable person under those circumstances. And I
2 paint. The body was on the floor, the face was down
3 When he lifted it up by the collar, the blood just
I 3 submit again if you are looking for how a reasonable
I 4 spurt out of that wound " Now, I bring that out for
4 person acts, you got to look at what the three boys
5 one simple reason, Ladies and Gentlemen, that's wh\ vvc
5 did. Yeah, they were stupid for going there. They
6 are here, a man was murdered, he was violently
6 were stupid for rushing a man who had a rifle. But at
7 the point that matters, the time of the murder, what
7 murdered. That's what this is all about That's what
9
8 did they do They back off, they left, they had
8 this case is. He's not here. But we are here because
9 accomplished their mission They had no intent, no
9 he was murdered
10 desire no motivation to try to shoot Darby. That's
10
One last glimpse into Darby's life that I
II what a reasonable person would have done. The
II think is kind of important for us. When these four men
12 Defendant was not acting as a reasonable person when he 12 ran toward Darby to beat him up, he never used the
13 picked the rifle up and shot it six times.
13 rifle. He came to the fight with a rifle but never
14
I am going to close, but I just want to say a
14 used it Now, some people may say, "Boy, that's
15 couple of things m closing: One of the hardest things
15 stupid That's real stupid, you got a rifle and didn't
16 for me as a trial attorney m a murder case is the fact
16 use it." But may I suggest that it shows something
17 that there is no victim here. You never get to see the
17 else, it shows that of all of the people there, he was
18 victim. We can't call him and put him up there. If
18 the only one that was concerned with not escalating a
19 this was an Attempted Murder, if this was an Aggravated 19 fight into something much more dangerously He's the
20 Assault, we'd call the victim and he or she would take
20 only one that was concerned about that. He didn't fire
21 the stand and you'd get to see them, you'd get to know
21 that weapon, he didn't use that weapon as a club, he
22 a little bit about them, what kind of person they are.
22 didn't even use it to defend himself. And, m fact, at
23 In a Murder case we just can't do that. The person's
23 one point what did he say? "Why are you here 9 " And at
24 gone
24 another point he said, "Take the rifle." He wanted
25
We try to give you a little glimpse into the
25 nothing of this escalated violence. That's a glimpse
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1 life of Darby Golby (sic) We don't know for sure what
2 kind of a man he was. We have heard a little bit here
3 and there The Defense may want to talk about his
4 earrings or whatever like that. But, whatever, he's a
5 human being. He had a life. He had ambitions and
6 dreams He had people who cared for him. And no one
7 had the right to take that away from him. The ultimate
8 disrespect, the ultimate violation of civil rights is
i 9 to take a man's life and kill him and murder him, and
10 that's what happened And no one, no one deserves
11 that
12
There's a couple of things that Mr — one
13 thing that I think is important is what Mr Drury had
14 to say Remember, he's the gentleman, the clerk at the
15 7-Eleven who saw it and perhaps gave the most objective
\\6 testimony of what happened that night. What did he
17 say 9 He talked about how the car pulled away and there
18 were three shots and the car went another 45 feet or so
19 and three more shots and that's the one that killed him
20 and it crashed. And then because Mrs. Koontz wanted to
21 know if that was her son or not, what did he do, he
22 went down to the truck and he came around to the truck
23 and opened the passenger side or the door and what did
24 he say 9 He said, "The first thing I saw was the blood.
25 It was so soaked on those bench - on that bench that
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1 into who Darby Golub is
2
We talk about guilt or innocence I like to
3 talk about whether or not a person should be held
4 responsible for what they did We've talked about it
5 The evidence is clear That night Russell Bisner shot
6 and killed and murdered Darby Golub That's what he is
7 responsible for Don't let him off with some
8 Manslaughter charge Don't give him some excuse that
9 it was only Manslaughter Don't pamper him It is
10 time he faced up He murdered a man that night He
11 should be held responsible And then let the Judge
12 decide what to do as far as the punishment But hold
13 him responsible for what he did, the Murder and the
14 Robbery of Darby Golub Thank you
15
THE COURT All right
16
Mr Dellapiana
17
MR DELLAPIANA Good afternoon, Ladies and
18 Gentlemen On behalf of my Co-counsel, Matt, and
19 myself, I'd like to say that I'm pleased to be here
20 today representing Russell in this matter I'm pleased
21 to have an opportunity now to talk to you about the
22 evidence And, as you know, there's two separate
23 charges I would like to start with the easier one,
24 the Aggravated Robbery or in this case the lack of

25 Aggravated Robbery
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Now, there's three reasons that Td like you
1 of Robbery for doing it? No
2 to consider as to why you should find for us not guilty
2
Second reason that you should find Russell
3 not guilty of Robbery is that taking a weapon under
3 of Aggravated Robbery. You heard that the Aggravated
4 these circumstances was not unlawful
4 Robbery needs to be intentional and unlawful. First
;
5
Okay, there is a third reason I'd like you to
5 consider the evidence from all of the witnesses, that
6 consider to find Russell not guilty of the Aggra\ itcd
6 this did not have anything to do with a robbery I
7 Robbery and that has to do with the aggravating
I 7 asked each of the witnesses, the witnesses
8 circumstances, and aggravating circumstances you ha\
8 individually, specifically, why they were going there
9 to use the - use the weapon, for example, to commit
9 and what was their intention, was there any intention
10 the robbery. Actually, there is several factors You
10 to commit a robbery that night? Each and every one of
II should understand that the State has to prove both the
II the witnesses that I asked about that said
12 robbery and aggravating factor. There can be asc ot a
12 specifically, "No, that sort of thing never came up
13
weapon, but if there wasn't a robbery, then there isn't
13 That never - it wasn't an issue." Why did they go?
14 Because Darby had called them out and threatened their 14 an Aggravated Robbery It is kind of - maybe it is
15 kind of confusing, the concept of Russell using Darby'
15 lives and called them out to meet them. This is, I
16 gun to commit a robbery against Darby I mean, it's
16 think, an example of a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
17 the sort of a thing that I think only a lawyer would
17 analysis. Now, if you have all of the witnesses saying
18 think of. I think that's kind of an illogical thing
18 specifically that something occurred or didn't occur,
19 and doesn't really fit with common sense and doesn't
19 then it's, if not impossible, I think at least
20 really fit with the circumstances in this case But,
20 unreasonable for you to determine the opposite. So,
21 anyway, because there wasn't a Robbery, there can't be
21 for that - that's the first reason I think you should
22 an Aggravated Robbery
22 find Russell not guilty of Aggravated Robbery.
23
Now, maybe if the - maybe if the -- let's
23
Second reason is: Aggravated Robbery needs
24 say the clerk in the 7-Eleven store some time later
24 to be - or the Robbery portion of the Aggravated
25 decided -- you know, got scared and took the gun that
25 Robbery, that's separate elements that the State needs
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1 to show, but the Robbery needs to be unlawful, an
2 unlawful stealing, for somebody unlawfully taking the
3 property. Now, here's the question, isn't it - would
4 any of you disagree that it would be perfectly proper,
5 permissible, to disarm somebody who's threatened you
6 with an assault weapon?
7
Let's look at a couple of examples: Let's
8 say that -- let's use the classic example of a robbery:
9 A guy goes into a 7-Eleven, pulls out a gun, tells the
10 clerk, "Give me your money," okay, well, there's a
, 11 robbery But let's say that the clerk then manages to
12 get the gun away from the robber, well, is the clerk
13 guilty of robbery? Of course not. The person would be
14 lawfully entitled to disarm a person under the
15 circumstances
\\6
Let's use another example that perhaps may
17 fit more closely with this concept of a bunch of young
18 guys getting — committing a fight. Let's have an
19 example of two boxers get in a ring and a guy in red
20 shorts, guy in blue shorts And they agree they are
21 going to have a little fight Let's say the guy m the
22 red shorts pulls a big gun out of his baggy shorts. He
23 points it at the guy in the blue shorts Well, does
24 the guy in the blue shorts have the right to disarm the
25 guy in the red shorts? Well, certainly. Is he guilty
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1 he took away home - took the gun he took away from the
2 7-Eleven - or from the robbery and took it home, in ay he
3 that's tampering with evidence or something But
4 because the taking was not unlawful, taking was
5 permissible, it was not a robbery And that's what >ou
6 have in this case
7
I think that where all the witnesses say that
8 this doesn't have anything to do with robbery, I gue^s,
9 it had something to do with a fight but not robbery,
10 where we have a situation where it is not unlawful to
, 11 disarm this fellow who had threatened their Lives with
112 an assault weapon and this question about aggravating
13 factor, I would ask you to find Russell not guilty on
14 that charge
15
Okay, so let's get to the real deal, are we
16 talking about a Murder or a Manslaughter? Was this a
17 situation that was an extreme emotional -- that created
18 an extreme emotional disturbance9 And just at the
19 start here let me say that I believe that the
20 instructions relate to whether a reasonable person in
21 those circumstances would feel an extreme emotional
22 disturbance And I think that that's what you need to
23 focus on in deciding whether the circumstances of this
24 case are of Murder or Manslaughter
25
As you know, we have indicated from the
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1 you need to get past that and put yourself in the
1 outset that there was never any doubt that Russell
2 situation to consider - to consider the issue that \ou
2 shot Darby, never denied it. The only question was,
3 need to consider And I'll talk about that some more
3 was it a Murder? I think it was not.
4 Let me put this gun back.
4
Judge, I am going to need to get Exhibit No.
5
All right. Some of the other circumstances
5 18
6 that showed up: I guess they expected this fight, but
6
THE COURT Sure, help yourself
7 they had been threatened with death. I think one of
7
MR DELLAPIANA I thought for a few seconds,
8 the witnesses, or both of them, said that Darby had
I 8 and it just crossed my mind, that I do some sort of
9 threatened to kill everybody. So, you know, m that
9 demonstration with you just to kind of see if we can do
10 an example of whether circumstances that occurred that 10 very short time span as they walk up and have the
11 threat and they see the gun and, you know, the hearts
11 night would create an extreme emotional disturbance
12 pounding, adrenaline is running through you, your
12 I'll promise I am not going to do it. What I was
13 mind's racing, thoughts to save yourself and save your
13 thinking for just a second is that I would grab the
14 friends and people you care about from a - and you arc
14 rifle in a way that it was described that Darby did and
15 looking at an army assault weapon m the hands of a
15 approach you and make sort of a threat or something,
16 drug-crazed person who has threatened your life, is
16 just to kind of try to get m you a mmd-set of instead
17 there any question that that wouldn't be the most
17 of being in this comfortable jury room of where —
18 extreme emotional disturbance that anybody can possibly
18 instead to try to put yourself in the circumstances
19 face? I really can't think of any except to think that
19 that existed that night, which is what you need to try
20 maybe if my only daughter was in that situation,
20 to do But, even after a few seconds - I mean, it
21 it's - it is frightening, and I think that is that 21 occurred to me that - struck me that that would be in
22 that's what you need to try to put yourself into
22 bad taste. It would be perhaps frightening, just too
23
Another part of this is that there was never
23 uncivilized to do even in the courtroom where, you
24 a cooling off period, okay. The extreme emotional
24 know, the gun is all tied up and it's — we have plenty
25 disturbance happened, and what did witnesses say,
25 of light, we have a secure facility of the bailiff back
Page 34
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1 here But even though lawyers have bad reputations, I
1 "Everything that happened after that happened within a
2 know that you would not really take seriously that I
2 few seconds." it is not like there's time to say,
3 was actually threatening you So what I am going to
3 "Well, you know, I'm going to go home and think about
4 ask you to do is ~ I think what you have to do to
4 this for a while and see if I'm really not afraid "
5 consider whether what happened that night was ~ would
5 The three of the - the three guys that walked away
j 6 create a reasonable -- create an extreme emotional
6 left Russ with - alone with this gun, who had just
7 disturbance in a reasonable person is to place yourself
7 been in a fight, was certainly angry about that, I
8 in the dark of night, 2 00 o'clock in the morning,
8 would think, still had the gun according to all the
9 empty parking lot, the lights at that part of the
9 other witnesses not to mention this other thing on his
10 parking lot are not working It's - you show up and
10 hand, the weights on it, some sort of other weapon, and
11 walk up to a person and, you know, as you are walking
11 then within seconds -- and there is some discussion
12 up to them, gets out of the car and at that point pulls
12 about, "Oh, it was, you know, 45 feet, you know" - I
13 a gun Nobody knew that Darby was bringing a gun up to
13 mean, let's look at this for a second. Where are
14 that point It was a surprise to everybody It —
14 those - where are those first bullet holes 9 Here is
15 there was screaming, yelling, angry, threatening things
15 the casings. Here's the bullet holes. If I can use
16 that - that I think nobody was able to desenbe after
116 something a little longer here. Okay, there is the
17 the fact You heard people, you heard the witnesses
17 casings, here is the bullet holes See these shots arc
18 talk about — one of them said he had some sort of a
18 happening within -- well, actually before — m the
19 brain — I forget what he said but - just from the
19 diagram, before they even have where the truck
20 adrenaline and fright he had just lost his mind,
20 supposedly starts - okay, here's, I guess, where they
21 basically We have a person that's much -- of
21 are trying to say the truck starts from, but here is
22 course - let me just stop for a minute and say I think
22 the casings Here's -- here's where the first shots
23 that the - that the fact that Darby died was tragic,
23 are fired, and that indicates that this is happening
24 it's sad, needless I am positive that everybody in
24 immediately. And if you recall what Dustin Symcs said
25 this courtroom, including Russ, feels that way But
25 at the - that was driving the truck that Russ came in,
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1 he said the first shot started before he even saw
2 Darby's truck starting to come around him. Some of the
3 other witnesses talk about that, everything happened
4 within one, two or three seconds. There's other people
5 that talk about - the whole range, the whole thing
6 occurred within one, two or three car lengths' of the
7 truck's movement. That was the testimony Even John
8 Drury, the guy that was up at the 7-Eleven, testified
9 that the whole sequence of events, from where the truck
10 started to when the truck got over here, was only about
11 five seconds And a lot of that time - we don't know
12 exactly what all of details are about that, but what we
13 do know is that everything happened m a very short
14 time span. There wasn't the time to cool off In fact
15 - here's another question. Prosecutor was talking to
16 you about whether there's - you know, he said, "Maybe
17 the first three shots would be something that would be
18 during an extreme emotional disturbance, maybe one,
19 maybe two, maybe three " You recall the difference
20 between the third shot and the fourth shot by John
21 Drury's testimony, because there was some testimony
22 that there was a slight break m between is - I think
23 he said one and a half seconds. He thought to himself
24 one and a half seconds. So where do we draw the line
25 between an extreme emotional disturbance and not?
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1 Where does it - is it the first, third bullet, fourth
2 bullet 9 There's not time. There needs to be more than
3 one and a half seconds for you to say that a person m
4 that circumstance facing an assault rifle and a threat
5 of death can go from from acting in an extreme
6 emotional disturbance -- which is only partial
7 justification, but it's what happened m this case —
8 to murder Is one and a half second enough for you to
9 say - well, you know, sure he shouldn't have done it.
10 Well, we admit that he shouldn't have done it. We
11 always have The question is: Should it be Murder or
12 Manslaughter 9 One and a half seconds I submit to you
13 is not enough for you to say that Russ ought to be
14 convicted of Murder. Sure he ought to be punished for
15 what he did, and we hope that you'll take all of that
16 into account in deciding what's appropriate.
17
I want to talk about some of the evidence and
18 in a little more detail. There's some emphasis by the
19 State on the testimony of Chris Lyman. You remember,
20 he was that little liar that sat up here. He was the
21 guy that - the LSD dealer, the drug dealer. And if
22 you recall, he's the guy who made I think - h e ' s still
23 trying to deny it. But made a deal to stay out of jail
24 by giving some testimony, by making a statement to
125 police which he repeated here in court. I want you to
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1 compare what he said with what the witnesses who wL
2 there at the scene. Of course, he's saying -- he's
3 talking about - Chris is talking about something 4 he's alleging that somebody who he vaguely knows sai
5 something -- as he's just kind of leaving his hou^c, he
! 6 sort of said, "Yeah, that Darby somebody is going to
7 die " And, you know, he wasn't there to know what
8 actually happened But that's not the main problem
9 with his testimony The main problem with his
10 testimony was his candor, credibility, his
11 truthfulness Remember how hard it was for me to get
12 him to admit that he had got a break on his jail time
13 I said, "Didn't you get a deal for this - giving this
14 statement 9 " "Why, no No, I did not" I mean, it is
15 a good thing I had some — I was able to dig up some
16 details on it to get him to finally admit that it was
17 an understanding he had with Van Midgley, the city
18 prosecutor, that he understood that he was to get 19 that he had to get some information and that - in
20 fact, how did he say that 9 I'm trying to remember
21 Something about if he didn't get the information, he'd
22 still be screwed. And then I had the information
23 that - that he actually did get eight days, and he
24 said, "And something else," which I couldn't get him tc
25 explain what's that something else But he - he lied
Page A
1 about that, and he tried to avoid responsibility for
2 for the something else, denied that it was part of any
3 deal, plus, if you recall, there was evidence that this
4 deal was intentionally kept secret All right
5 Remember, as we are going through the transcript, the
6 part where he's reading or I'm reading, we are going
7 through and it says, "I can't promise you anything
8 wink, wink, because it will look bad m court It will
9 look bad. It looks bad in court. They will think the
10 deal was made for you to talk and you could have made
11 it up " Well, then he lied about it And what
12 happened? We know he lied because finally he admittc
13 "Yeah, the --1 can't remember whether it was the
14 detective or the prosecutor went and talked to the
15 judge." You remember he was kind of confused about
16 that, that somebody talked to prosecutor about that or
17 the judge. "Some time off your sentence 9 " "Well,
18 yeah. Yeah, I guess I did."
19
You know, you have an instruction that sa>s
20 when you consider the bias of witnesses, that you can
21 disregard entirely the testimony of any witness that
22 you find testifies falsely or has special interest or
23 bias m the case. And you should disregard Chris
24 Lyman's testimony because he lied; also because his
25 testimony is so different from the people who were
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1 there and people who, yes, have -- who have accepted
1 is it that Darby is the one who's acting reasonably )
2 If Russ and his friends had intended harm, I mean, the
2 responsibility to some extent for their actions You
3 harm of the sort that's being charged here today, they
3 recall specifically I asked - I asked Dustin Symes, I
4 would have been the ones that took the gun. They
4 said - because you remember what Chris Lyman was
5 talked about it, apparently. "Maybe we should take
5 testifying about was -- he claimed that Russ had some
6 some weapons, naw," because that's not what it was
6 sort of a debt that he was going to -- he didn't -7 actually, let's be clear, he didn't say that - he
7 about at least from their point of view Darby's the
8 didn't say that Russ said that Russ was going to kill
8 one who brought it Darby is the one that brought the
J 9 anybody He didn't say Russ was going to kill anybody 9 only weapon, brandished it, threatened with it None
10 He didn't say who was going to die. He didn't say
10 of this would have happen without Darby He's the
11 anybody was going to die, like, tonight or anything
11 instigator of this thing.
12 like that. But even the hint he made was that it was
12
Dustin also testified that this never had
13 about a debt. But you remember the people who were
13 anything to do with any debt that might have been owed
14 there Dustin and Derek. In fact, let's go to Derek
14 for Russ But let's assume that just a minute, that it
15 first. Derek was with Russ all evening, and Derek
15 was about a debt There is no evidence --1 mean, the
16 Pearson and Russ apparently did go over to this guy's
16 evidence - the eyewitness — the evidence - the
17 house So Derek was with him all night. And I asked
17 testimony of the eyewitnesses is completely to the
18 Derek specifically, and I think - you know, you heard
18 contrary. I mean, that would not be a bright thing to
19 Derek's testimony I think he came across as a fairly
19 do. That wouldn't be the right to thing to do But it
20 credible young man. And Derek indicated, no, this had 20 would be - a fist fight, you know, not a murder that
21 nothing to do with any debt Derek was aware of the
21 was intended.
22 debt, but Derek specifically said, "No, Russ didn't
22
THE COURT Two minutes, Mr Dellapiana.
23 even seem to care about it." He was never angry about
23
MR DELLAPIANA Okay.
24 it, never made any threats over it, didn't even come up
24
Let's talk briefly about 25 that night
25
Judge, I wonder if you'd give me a little bit
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1
In fact, that night didn't seem really to
2 have that much to do with Russ at all. If you recall
3 back at Justin's house, sure, the phone was being
4 passed around, but ultimately it was Dustin who said —
5 who was arguing with Darby and said -- you know and
6 they were talking trash back and forth. Finally hung
7 up and said to all of the other guys, "Let's go." So
I 8 it wasn't Russ who started this problem.
9
When they got to the 7-Eleven, you recall
10 John Drury said - let's see, Derek was out front
11 talking with Russ Justin out m front having a
12 conversation about general stuff. And we have
13 information that Justin ran out of the - dropped his
14 nachos and ran out of the store, angry, ready for a
15 fight You know, Russ was just standing there having a
16 chat And they got down there. And if you recall the
17 testimony, Dustin goes up, pops the guy in the head
18 with the bat Derek and Justin are throwing fists
19 They don't even see Russ. Russ isn't even involved m
20 this thing until suddenly they back away from him,
21 leave Russ there alone with this - with this guy who's
22 threatened their lives and who brought a gun. You
23 know, I don't see what's reasonable - really - one
24 thing that really bothered me about this ~ the State's
25 opening, they tried to twist it completely around How

Page 44
1 more time if I promised to try to speed up a little
2 bit?
3
Well, here we go.
4
Actually, I have quite a few additional
5 things There is a lot of details m the evidence,
6 some of what is conflicting, some is undisputed For
7 example, there is a statement right at the beginning of
8 this case that Russell phoned Darby and left a
9 threatening message. There is no evidence of that I
10 asked specifically - specifically asked Derek, I said,
11 "Derek" -- because he kind of said, "Well, I kind of
12 got the impression that somebody left a message, ma>be
13 it was Russ " He didn't see anything like that He
14 didn't hear anything like that I mean, my dad always
15 told me, "Don't believe — or don't believe anything
16 you hear and only half of what you see. And Derek
117 didn't see or hear anything in this case
18
There is a lot of statements that were made
19 Most of the witnesses stated that they didn't - they
20 didn't really remember what they were saying I know
21 that Justin Koontz, for example, said something
22 about -- today said something about take the gun,
23 something about that he heard Russell cock the gun
24 This is the first time that we ever heard anything like
25 that from him.
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1
MR STOTT Your Honor, I would object to
1 about - generally considered on a scale to be about S(
2 that That is not the state of the evidence
2 percent It is a sort of a case like in a contract
3
THE COURT Well, the Jury will remember
3 case, a contract dispute on - did the contractor agree
4 having now heard two days' worth of evidence what it
! 4 to build me a 20 foot concrete platform for my patio c
5 was And I told them this is simply argument This is
5 was it 30 feet, that sort of thing, and the e\ ldcnce is
6 Counsel's interpretation They are to rely on their
6 about - it's - it's whichever one has a little bit
7 own judgment as to what the evidence actually showed
7 more evidence than the other If you apply that to the
8
MR DELLAPIANA That's correct, Your Honor
I 8 evidence in this case -- if you find yourself on some
9 Thank you, Your Honor
9 point that you say, "You know, we really don't know
10
Back m his first day when he said, I think
10 It is about 50/50 There is evidence both ways It is
11 on cross-examination, this was read into the record
11 hard to decide," that would be somewhere around the
12 "I was walking away, so I really didn't see anything
12 preponderance standard And if you were to find
13 Then I heard gunshots And Darby was driving off And 13 yourself in that position, you would be required to
14 that's all I saw I got scared We got m the truck
14 find Russ not guilty on that point
15 and ran," which kind of disputes this concept of, "Oh,
15
There is another standard of clear and
16 the fight was over, everything was fine " He was
16 convincing evidence This is a standard that would
17 scared He got m the truck He ran That was his
17 apply if, for example, you were to - the State *vas
18 testimony And I appreciate the Judge for reminding me 18 trying to take the kids away from you, all right,
19 that what Mr Stott said isn't evidence You need to
19 trying to do a parental termination, they'd have to
20 remember the actual evidence when you take into
20 prove by clear and convincing evidence you are an unfi
21 consideration what happened and what the circumstances 21 parent before they could take your kids away from you
22 were there that night
22 Now that's a pretty high standard because the State
23
In terms of whether his flight from the scene
23 doesn't want to be taking kids away from their parents
24 was evidence of quilt, as we've indicated a couple of
24 Beyond a reasonable doubt standard is even higher than
25 times, he's never denied what he did, the only question
25 that, and it has to be — you know, I'm going to say
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1 is what is fair, what's fair for him to take
1 this because Mr Stott indicated it is not 100 percenl
2 responsibility for under these circumstances?
2 There is — there has been a statement m a court case
3
There is some other details about the 3 that it is approximately 99 percent You have to be
4 about the question of ability of the witnesses to
4 very, very sure as to what to do before you find
5 observe the details There is some questions about the
5 somebody guilty There's a particular — there s a
6 details of what actually happened I mean, it was
6 particular — one particular — oh, let's see, one
7 dark Dustm, do you remember, he said he had bad
7 particular thing I want to argue, that it there is a
8 eyesight After popping Darby in the head, he said he
8 question about which of the two offenses that you
9 turned around and went back to the truck, didn't really
9 should find on - and in regards to the Murder charge,
10 see anything after that Justin, remember, he didn't
10 you have Murder and you have Manslaughter - you need
11 see the gun, he didn't see Russ, he didn't see Darby or
111 to — I mean, if there is a reasonable doubt as to
12 Derek had a bat Derek, of course, was on
12 which applies, you are required to find only the
13 hallucinogens So some of the details here I think you
13 lesser I mean, if there is evidence both ways and you
14 need to take into account are not really clear as to
14 say, "Well, there is some evidence that he shot him,
15 what exactly happened
15 he's admitted that But, yeah, it seems like a
16
The only real undisputed things are that
16 reasonable person under those circumstances would Ix in
17 Darby called these guys up, threatened to kill them,
17 a situation where they would reasonably feel an extreme
18 called them out to the parking lot, brought a gun
18 emotional disturbance for which there is a good reason
19 unbeknownst to them and brandished it when he got out 19 a good reason being Darby brought out an assault weapon
20 and threatened your life with it" I mean, if there LS
20 of the vehicle
21a reasonable question as to which of those applies you
21
Finally, in regards to the reasonable doubt
22 have to go with the Manslaughter
22 question that Counsel was reading about, what the
23
Just as ~ just as m our society we hope
23 standards are, we'll briefly describe for comparison
24 that, you know, things like deaths like this don't
124 sake there is three major standards of proof in court
25 occur, and that that's a bad thing and it is a thing
25 cases One is preponderance of the evidence That's
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1 under a threat to kill. Well, the threat to kill was
1 that we need to deal with as a society and use you as
2 given over a phonecall 30 minutes earlier. And,
2 jurors, need to take that into account, the same way in
3 obviously, if that caused extreme emotional
3 our society we don't want to convict people unfairly of
j 4 disturbance, you stay home, you don't go down to the
4 criminal charges, especially when we are talking about
5 parking lot. This threat to kill had absolutely no
5 Murder. And for that reason I would ask you to give
6 relevance to extreme emotional disturbance.
6 this young man what he deserves, what he deserves is
7
Drug crazed. Well, he tells us that
7 the Manslaughter charge. Thank you.
8 Mr. Lyman - that the Defendant -- excuse me, Mr Golub
8
THE COURT: All right.
9 was drug crazed. Is there any evidence of that? Now,
9
Mr. Stott.
10
MR. STOTT. Thank you.
10 come on? Come on, now. What evidence of that9 Who
11
I won't be long, just an opportunity to
11 was crazed that night? Four men who charged a guy with
12 respond to some of the comments made by Defense. As 12 a rifle or the one who had the rifle and didn't do
13 far as the Aggravated Robbery, he tells us that it was
13 anything, absolutely no aggression on his part
14 not intentional. Well, again, look at the
14 whatsoever. Who was crazed, the ones who knocked him
15 instructions. There is nothing in the instructions
15 over the head with a bat and hit him or the one that
16 that require us to prove that this was an intentional
16 didn't do anything? Who was crazed? The one who said,
17 robbery, nothing that requires us to prove that they
17 "What are you doing this for? Take it." And then
18 went there with the intent to rob. We have to show an
18 tried to leave. Or the one who picked up the rifle,
19 intentional taking, that's all we have to show. And
19 cocked it and shot six times at another individual who
20 certainly there was an intentional taking. Now,
20 was fleeing? Now who was crazed? Certainly, it wasn't
21 somehow Mr. Dellapiana believes that if you can — what 21 Darby Golub.
22 was the word — disarm someone, that's okay. Well,
22
He says that Dustin Symes testified that he
23 this is not a case of disarming, this is not like a
23 heard a shot and then saw Mr. Golub's truck. That's
24 7-Eleven clerk, a 7-Eleven clerk who disarms someone
24 not what he testified to. You'll have the memory of
25 who's trying to rob him. They give the gun to the
25 that. But what he testified to was he heard the shots
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1 police officer. They don't take it home and hide it.
2 That's the taking, the taking home and hiding it. And
3 that's what Mr. Bisner did here. He took the gun home.
4 That's an unlawful taking. And he hid it. And that's
5 it.
6
He talks about the extreme emotional
7 disturbance at the time these four got out of the truck
8 and saw Darby 30 or 20 feet away with a rifle. Well,
9 again, as I talked about before, there is no evidence
10 that they were suffering from extreme emotional
11 disturbance, none of them; especially absolutely no
12 evidence as to what Mr. Bisner was suffering under. In
13 fact, we know that they didn't have that fear because
14 what did they do, they charged him, they didn't turn
15 around. But that's not important. Frankly, the key
16 here is ~ I think we can all understand the key is
17 what about at the time of the shooting? Was Mr. Bisner
18 under extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the
19 shooting? Well, how can he be? Darby didn't have the
20 rifle He had been beat up, he had been hit with a
21 bat, he had been hit with a fist, he was trying to get
22 away. He gave the rifle to him. He said, "Take it."
23 And he was 45 feet away when Mr. Bisner when started to
24 fire. Under those circumstances how could he claim
25 extreme emotional disturbance? Talks about they were
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1 at the same time he saw Mr. Golub's truck coming
2 around, at the same time. He thinks somehow that this
3 whole thing occurred very rapidly and so that means
4 that it was Manslaughter. Well, it did occur rapidly,
5 but, again - and I think that's why this diagram is so
6 important, we can see how this occurred and especially
7 in relationship to John Drury's testimony. We are
8 talking about 45 feet away here where the first shot
9 occurred because the glass is here. The first shot was
10 not effective, and so I he went - excuse me, here is
11 the first shot. And he went another - it is 65 feet
12 to here. And he went another 45 feet, and there was
13 more shots. Why? Because the first shots weren't
14 successful. The last shot was successful. And he
15 didn't have to shoot anymore. Because what did
16 Mr. Drury say? That was the time when he could tell
17 that something had happened.
118
Talks about Chris Lyman. I don't know what
19 to make of it. Mr. Lyman testified. You heard his
20 testimony. He said, no, he wasn't given any promise.
21 The main thing he did -- okay, there is something about
22 the city prosecutor or judge in Sandy, but absolutely
23 nothing to do with us, the people involved in this
24 case. In fact, he said - you read the - the Defense
25 had him read a transcript from Mr. Peterson's intcn icw
D^~^
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(2), (3)(i)(j),
and will require review of the court's decision of direct appeal decision on November 20,
2001 in case no. 20000026-SC in light of new facts and evidence.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1: The habeas court erred in dismissing the petition. Standard of review is
giving no deference to the lower court's conclusions of law but review them for
correctness. See Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 252 (Utah 1998)
Issue A: The Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and on
first appeal of right. These claims present mixed questions of fact and law which
generally get reviewed de novo. See Banks v. Reynolds. 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir.
1995).

Issue B: The prosecution in its failure to disclose requested and unrequested
Brady, Agurs and Bagley materials and or lied about availability or presence violated due
process and deprived me of a fair trial. This issue also presents a mixed question of law
and fact thus is reviewed de novo. See Banks, id. atl516.
ISSUE 2: The court committed plain and rule 30(a) error in appointing counsel for
appeal that was recommended by counsel who initiated conflict issues without holding a
conflict hearing. Review is under plain error and exceptional circumstances. Dunn, supra
and State v Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987).
ISSUE 3: The trial, appeal and habeas proceedings were replete with many
instances of plain rule 30(a) and prejudicial error as well as cumulative error, resulting in
a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Review would be correction of error under Julian,
supra but would also involve interpretation of a statute which is a legal conclusion
reviewed for correctness; State v. Lusk, 37 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Utah 2001), and involves
legal conclusions giving no deference to the court's conclusions. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d
930, 933 (Utah 1998).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
All determinative provisions will be set forth in the body of the brief or addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/RELEVANT FACTS
On January 11, 1999 appellant was charged with murder and aggravated robbery.
There were two discovery requests on February 22, 1999 and May 10, 1999. Several
procedural motions were filed, all of which were denied. On October 1, 1999 the court
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sentenced me to two 5-year to life terms with a 1-year firearm enhancement, all running
consecutively. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial filed on November 23,
1999.
An appeal before the Utah Supreme Court ensued being denied on November 20,
2001, case no. 20000026. (See exhibit 1. Procedural history therein is correct.)
Petition for Extra Ordinary Relief was filed. After a morass of paperwork the
petition was denied on January 1, 2003 without hearing. (See exhibit 2: final order of
dismissal).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In a pro se action the liberal construction doctrine under Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 20 (1972) mandates that if a cause of action can be read into a pro se pleading,
the reviewing court must do so.
In this case there are many structural defects described in Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619, 623, 629-30 (1993) where when these defects are obvious relief must be
granted based on the injurious and substantial effect or influence on the jury's verdict
standard announced therein. The issues presented herein should have had Judge
Fredericks in "grave doubt" or "so evenly balanced as being in a virtual equipoise" he
should have found in my favor. See Oneal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1995).
The issues of ineffective trial and appellate counsel under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Banks v.
Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1995) and the issues involving prosecution misconduct
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under Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Kyles v. Whitley. 115 S.Ct. 1555
(1995); Banks, id- 1516-1522, and their progeny. The judge, if he had fundamental
fairness in mind 4as well as protecting my fundamental inalienable rights, should have
granted relief. He, because of the factual and legal dispute, should have at least ordered
an evidentiary hearing but probably didn't because his Trial Court and judgment was at
issue. There is no other conclusion that can be drawn.
The lies, suppression of exculpatory evidence, proof of ineffective counsel and his
bias and prejudice was all uncovered and evident in the record.
The Supreme Court has clearly stated summary judgment is not proper in verified
proceedings. Pentacost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985); Draper City v. Estate
Bernada, 888 P.2d 1907 (Utah 1995), and I showed that there were genuine issues for a
new trial by alleging facts making it unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction
because had this evidence been discovered and/or available at trial a different result
would be, and the Jury's verdict would be undermined. Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d 599
(Utah App. 1993); Casida v. Deland, 866 P.2d 599 (Utah App. 1993); Hurst v. Cook, 866
P.2d 1029 (Utah App. 1989). The court erred in granting on this issue.
Dismissal is not proper because the presented issues were questions of law and
fact, Gonzales v. Morris, 610 P.2d 1285 (Utah 1980), and I alleged and proffered factual
data in support of my claims. Andrews v. Morris, 608 P.2d 816 (Utah 1980). The court
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abused its discretion in denying relief and ordering the case dismissed, because in a
proper forum I should have been granted relief on my proven facts.
The Supreme Court stated in Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998) that
when a court grants relief it does so on the 5ground that the petitioner has been wrongfully
incarcerated, that is to say that a "court SHOULD GRANT RELIEF if the petitioner
establishes that he or she has been deprived of due process of law" or that "it would be
unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction." Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968, 969
(Utah 1968).
If the district court and habeas court concluded I had a fair trial and the process
due under both state and federal due process and effective assistance of counsel clauses,
then I guess it must be that Utah courts are right and thousands of other courts including
opinions of Utah courts are wrong thus effectively spitting in all other courts faces
including the district court's own face.
The conviction and past review of it are contrary to the rudimentary principles of
justice constituting a fundamental miscarriage of justice because the state does not have a
strong case when the full facts are properly considered. Kyles at 429. See Kenney v.
Tamavo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 12 (1992).
Under Julian and Brown the petition should have been granted and a new trial
ordered. See Walker and Kyles, supra.
I have effectively proven that the state has "tinkered" with the fact finding process
and the entire integrity of the system, continued this on direct appeal, and in the habeas
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proceeding and will probably do so again now. The court should reverse the district court
6

denial of the petition and remand with instructions to hold the necessary hearings and

grant appropriate relief or grant an outright reversal and order a new trial.
ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT 1: "The district (habeas) court erred in dismissing the petition."
Based on the preceding Summary of Argument, under Julian, id. 257 and Brown at 969;
see supra brief at pages 3-65 the court erred in granting partial summary judgment and
dismissal of the facts verified in the 65 C petition because of the constitutional violations
alleged and proven herein and in the record.
This argument will be furthered and referenced to as we proceed with this brief in
the different sub-arguments.
Sub-Argument A: "The petitioner was denied effective assistance of trial and
appellate counsel and improperly denied counsel on his habeas case." Because of the
conflict of interest in this case, see State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357 (Utah 1994), and of
both trial and appellate counsels' lack of willingness to identify with my case, as this
court said in State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah App. 1997), was a fundamental concept
in representation which involves the fundamental fairness of a proceeding. I need to
explain my disclosure issue of Argument B in the concept of my counsel argument
because they go hand in hand with each other and are hard to separate because both in
combination are inherently responsible for the compromising of my rights.
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Sub-Argument B: "The prosecution erred in its failure to disclose requested and
unrequested Brady, Agurs and Bagley materials and/or lied of their presence which
denied the appellant of due process and a fair trial."
The main question here is did the omitted evidence create a reasonable doubt as to
guilt, prejudice the defense and result in the denial of a fair trial? The answer is most
emphatically yes, when combined and even standing independent from the other claims
raised herein.
The Utah Supreme Court in Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981) very clear
in the habeas case of Willie Mae Walker where the same sort of prosecution misconduct
seriously interfered with the trial court's truth seeking process and function. Id. 691. This
combined with other acts of misconduct created the same unjust miscarriage of justice
here, affecting the Judgment of the jury.
Further, does the materiality of, versus absence of, evidence omitted based on the
misconduct have an injurious or substantial effect of influence in determining the Jury's
verdict? See Brecht id. 623. Yes, because [of] the withheld evidence the prosecution's
case seemed much stronger and my case much weaker than the full facts suggested.
Kyles, id. 429.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court (The Court) decision in Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103 (1935), the rule has been that where the state knowingly uses perjured
testimony, such a "contrivance by the state to procure the conviction" is inconsistent with
justice. Id. at 112-13. Courts have therefore assumed that "if it is established that the
7

government knowingly permitted the introduction of false testimony 'reversal is virtually
automatic5." See United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 456 (2nd Cir. 1991).
In a series of cases prior to Brady involving either perjured testimony or
prosecutorial suppression of evidence that would have demonstrated the falsity of trial
testimony The Court sought to maintain the integrity of the process. For example, in
Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957) a prosecutor instructed a witness to withhold
evidence about his relationship with the decedent resulting in a mistaken impression of
the nature of the accused's participation in the crime. The instruction was deemed
significant to the integrity of the proceeding and the acceptability of the result. Similarly
in Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942) the court held a habeas petitioner was
entitled to his freedom because the conviction was obtained by the State's knowing use of
perjured testimony.
After Brady in United States v. Agurs, supra at 104, The Court observed that it had
consistently held that a conviction obtained by the use of perjured likelihood the false
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury, testimony was fundamentally
unfair and must be set aside if there is any reasonable
In Nix v.Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1986) The Court declared that a lawyer
who presents perjury on behalf of a defendant commits an illegal act. The Nix court
noted that the canonical ethics of the bar and the model code of professional
responsibility impose on ALL lawyers the duty to prevent and disclose frauds. More
recently with respect to prosecutors the Ninth Circuit put the point brief and clear,
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"a prosecutor has a duty (special duty) commensurate with a prosecutor's unique power

to assure that defendants receive fair trials." United States v. Lapage, 231 F.3d 488, 492
(9th Cir. 2000). See Walker, supra at 691-92. Such has not happened here.
Also recently, a prosecutor put before the jury testimony of an accomplice against
a defendant without disclosing to the defense the existence of a letter implementing the
accomplice and others in a plot to frame the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Bowie,
243 F3d 1109-1111-1114 (9th Cir. 2001). The court concluded that the Government's
failure to discover the origin of the letter aided in the commission if a FRAUD on the
trial process. (Such is the case here with the plea bargains of the accomplices and with the
existence of GSR reports and results.) As reflecting on the realities of the court system the
Ninth Circuit correctly noted "each contract for testimony by a [government witness] is
fraught with the real peril that the professed testimony will not be truthful but simply
factually contrived to "get" a target of sufficient interest to induce concessions from the
government. Id. 1124. In reversing the conviction the court said that recent studies have
demonstrated that in about 1 out of 5 cases involving DNA exonerated defendants, the
defendants had been inculpated by an accomplice's or informant's testimony. Id. 1124
n.6. Thus, there is a lengthy history of judicial intolerance for a governmental "tinkering"
with the integrity of the process through the introduction of false, contrived, or
misleading evidence.
10

When prosecutors fail to disclose such information they compromise the integrity

of the proceedings; viz, the fact finding process at trial and review by a higher court
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(such as in this case in case #20000026). There are times when prosecutors forget or
ignore the ethics of his office out of their desperation to convict, and fail to disclose
Brady, Blake, Kyles, Aqurs material, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n. 25 (1976).
There are also (like this case with the decedent's past) (the plea agreements as well as
GSR information) times when a prosecutor will seek to win a case by
intentionally hiding material impeachment evidence from defense counsel (rendering him
ineffective.)
In the case of Campbell v. Reed, 594 F.2d 4 (4th Cir. 1979), by intentionally
concealing impeachment evidence described by Gigilio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972) a prosecutor negotiated a deal with the accomplice that was kept secret from the
defense. In exchange for the testimony the accomplice would receive a reduced prison
term. In testifying the accomplice denied any deal and exclaimed he was just doing his
"civic duty" (as is this case). The Fourth Circuit granted Campbell's habeas petition
holding that the prosecutor's failure to correct the accomplice's "unwittingly false
testimony" violated due process. See id. at 7.
But, sadly enough, such prosecutorial misconduct continues despite appellate court
decisions such as these. In Singh v. Prunty, 142 F.3d 1157 (9 Cir. 1998) for example, the
prosecutor kept from the defense information regarding benefits conferred on its major
witness (such as this case). In United States v. Koiayan, 8 F.3d n 1315 (9th Cir. 1993) the
court reversed a conviction because the appellant proved the U.S. Attorney concealed
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Brady information on a cooperation agreement with a material witness/informant and
continued to scheme on appeal. ( Sounds familiar don't it? See #20000026, exhibit 1.)
Similarly our Tenth Circuit stays consistent with the other circuits and the U.S.
Supreme Court in Banks v. Reynolds, supra, id- at 1516-1522, particularly id. 1517 where
the court explains as should be noted in this case, "that the prosecutors obligation to turn
over the evidence in the first instance stands independent of the defendant's knowledge"
(citations omitted). This goes to the heart of appellant's prior appeal and trial in concert
with the proper presentation of the case now and its additional issue of ineffective trial
and appellate counsel. This court must examine the merits of the omitted issues when the
habeas petitioner alleges ineffective appellate counsel and his failure to raise the issues
and [in] this case the conflict of interest posed as presented. See Banks, id. 1515.
This court must be guided by the statement made in Aqurs, 427 U.S. at 10-11 that
there are situations in which the evidence is obviously of such substantial value to the
defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without specific request.
It also must be further noted a prosecutor can delegate the duty to search for impeachment
material. See United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488-1491-92 and n.3 (9th cir. (1992);
Walker, 690, 91 (citations omitted). 12Objective viewing of the government in fact
withholding information of the victims violent past effectively eliminated my self defense
theory (as well) (as) (attacking the Winship requirement of being found guilty of every
fact necessary to constitute the offense), the offense element as well since the self
defense/lack of intent defense was corroborated by documentary proof of the victim's
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violent acts prior to his death even though I've never seen the documents as well as by
testimony of the decedent's own wife, family and friends. United States v. James, 169
F.3d 1210, 1214-15 (9th cir 1999); Banks, supra similar and Medina v. Barnes, 71 F.3d
363 (10th cir 1995); Stouffer v. Reynolds, 214 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2000); State v. Knoll,
712P. 2d 211,214 (Utah 1985) (declaring that when evidence is produced by prosecution
or defense which would provide some reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that a
killing was done to protect the defendant from an imminent threat of death by another an
instruction on self defense should be given the jury.) The simple evidence the decedent
came there, pulled the assault rifle on the defendant and the defendant disarmed him in
combat conclusively provided the "basis in evidence for the theory." Knoll, id. 214. This
was admitted by prosecution as well as defense counsels. See UCA § 76-2-402 (1999).
This evidence was obviously of substantial value to the defense, elementary
fairness required it to be disclosed even without a specific request; Aqurs, 110-11; Kyles,
supra at 429 and had a substantial and injurious effect 13on the jury's verdict. Brecht, id.
623; Kyles, 435, A prudent prosecutor will resolve all doubts in favor of disclosure;
Kyles, at 439, Aqurs, at 108 as echoing The Court "this is how it should be." Kyles, id.
Other evidence conclusive of the self defense/lack of intent issue which was
know[n] by prosecution and defense counsel, withheld by prosecution, not used in
investigation or preparation of defense or not raised on first appeal as presented in
argument 2 are as follows:
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From officer Webb; (chain was in victim's hand);
A. Item #21, 31" chain victim had (package 196-21)
B. Item #21, picture #15, picture of victims 31" chain
C. Item #22, package (pkg) 196-22, syringe found on victim
D. Item #26, pkg. 196-26, GSR kit taken from victim (see exhibit 3)
From Officer Hanes;
E. Item #3, pkg. 174-3, GSR kit from Timothy Thornblad
F. Item #4, pkg. 174-4, GSR kit from Justin Koontz
G. Item #5, pkg. 174-5, GSR kit from Dustin Symes
H. Item #6, pkg. 174-6, GSR kit from Derrick Pearson
From officer May; (photos in photo log);
I. Roll #2, photos #15, #16 of syringe on ground by victim's door
J. Roll #2, photos 19-21, syringe and copper jacket on victim's dashboard
K. Roll #4, photo 18, rounds on victim's driver-side floorboard
L. Roll #4, photo 19, rounds in victim's driver's door pocket
M. Roll #7, photos 17-18, guns in gun rack (victim)
N. Roll #7, photos 22-23 of shotgun and SKS rifle (victim)
O. Roll # , photo 24, plastic tube on floor between victim's seats
P. Item #32, pkg. 188-27, bullet jacket found in victim's vehicle
Q. Item #33, pkg. 188-28, syringe on floorboard - victim's vehicle
R. Item #34, pkg. 188-29, syringe on dashboard of victim's vehicle
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S. Item #35, pkg. 188-30, syringe on ground outside victim's driver's door
T. Item #57, pkg. 188-52, rubber hose - victims vehicle
U. Item #58, pkg. 188-53, unknown black substance - victim - 27 grams.
V.
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Item #59, pkg. 188-54, victim's vehicle - pipe, glass (dope)

W. Item #60, pkg. 188-55, victim - pipe (metal)
X. Item #61, pkg. 188-56, bullets -victim's vehicle floorboard 7.62 x 39 (2)
Y. Item #64, pkg. 188-59, syringe in black case - driver's side floorboard of
victims vehicle
Z. Item #65, pkg. 188-60, bullets (5) 7.62x39 - driver's side pocket of victims
vehicle
AA.Item #67, pkg. 188-62, film, 10 rolls of crime scene from Officer Williams
(recovered from victim)
BB. Item#GWl, pkg. GW1, rifle magazine possibly SKS
CC. Item#GW3, pkg. GW2, plastic pumpkin containing empty syringe bags (2)
and (2) empty ammo boxes 7.62x39.
Now, the syringes, paraphernalia, etc. establish his drug abuse, a toxicology report
at the time of autopsy would have proved some form of ingestion, illegal substances being
found on victim prove illicit drug abuse which, all this, including the fact he came to the
place where I was with the intent to harm me which is evidenced by;
A. Possession of the 31" chain,
B. Possession of the Assault rifle.
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If he had no intent to harm me then why did he have the weapons and choose to
come after me. This is proven. My only intent was to defend my life because it was
threatened. I Possessed NO weapon.
Further the drug abuse severely hyped his state of mind because he was a maniac.
Look at what was found in HIS vehicle. He was not the outstanding citizen the State
attempted to make him out to be. The photo they showed to the jury 15of him was a photo
taken of him in military school. What is military school? This evidence was exculpatory
in nature because it proved his intent to harm me and proved my intent to self-defense, to
not let him kill me.
The evidence proved his, all but, squeaky clean nature, disposition, position in
community and most emphatically impeached is innocence. He was NOT an innocent
victim as portrayed by the State and this is evidenced by Officer James' January 8, 1999
interview with his wife Natalie Gulob concerning the violent nature of her husband, and
to establish he carried weapons with him at ALL TIMES and this too was NEVER
submitted.
Now, the assignment of this error to a single entity is hard because it is not known
whether counsel knew of this or not. If he did and didn't raise it, it is further affects of the
conflict of interest he admitted he had as his basis for wanting to be disqualified (see
exhibit 4) in that if he knew then he failed to prepare a defense, if he didn't, he failed to
investigate and prepare a defense. See Holland and Classon, supra, citing Osborn v.
Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 625 (10th Cir. 1985). See also Banks, supra; Osborn at 629.
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If the prosecutor knew and failed to disclose, which he did, upon request or not,
then we have both due process and 6 amendment issues as well as violations of article 1
§§ 7, 12; § 77-32-1 (2)(3)(4)(1998); renumbered § 77-32-301 (1999 Supp.) because
16

counsel failed to have undivided loyalty, see Holland at 360-61, because of his conflict,

failed to utilize investigatory resources available to him, see State v. Bums, 4 P.3d 795
(Utah 2000), which constitutes failure to investigate and prepare a defense, see Osbourn,
Banks, and Holland, supra, constitutes a deprivation of due process rendering counsel
ineffective, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); Cronic v. United
States, 466 U.S. 648,659-62 (1984), preventing a fair trial, violating due process
rendering the conviction fundamentally unfair as manifest injustice. See Banks, id. at
1516, 1522.
Because there was no opportunity for the appellant to present his evidentiary facts
at a lower court hearing the court erred in not conducting a hearing and granting relief.
See Brecht and Oneal, supra at 3. The convictions are a miscarriage of justice. Because I
can show evidence of self-defense this not only negates the intent of felony murder but
necessarily voids the aggravated robbery also because there simply was NO ROBBERY.
See State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990).
These issues were critical and material to the guilt or innocent determination in
this matter. The GSR test of the victim was critical also for the self-defense theory when I
stated he fired at me first. The State denied that the GSR test was 17ever preformed on the
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victim after repeated request but it was found after trial that conclusively it was done
and there were results. (See exhibit 3.)

I

This further would have supported my lack of intent to want to hurt the victim
much less kill and rob him. I never intended to hurt him, he intended to hurt me. This is
evident, he produced the weapon, fired it at me, I had no weapon and brought no weapon
out with me that night. Since intent is an element of the offense it was never conclusively
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Knoll; in re Winship, 397 U.S. 358-364 (1970);
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
The prosecution lied on several occasions of the testing of and results of GSR tests
being performed on the victim. (See exhibits 3,4.)
A. On February 2, 1999 a specific discovery request was made for the GSR test
results. On March 9, 1999 the prosecution said no test was performed.
B. On May 6, 1999 a second specific request was made by defense for the GSR
test results and a specific "no test was preformed" answer was given by the
prosecution on May 17, 1999. (See exhibit 4.)
The prosecution intentionally withheld these results and affirmatively "lied" of 2
facts; that no tests were preformed and no test results existed. (Let it be known that if
defense counsel knew they existed this rendered him ineffective because in either case it
destroyed my affirmative proof of the self-defense theory and manslaughter theory,
destroyed my ability to prove decedent's propensity to violence which is supported in the
record.)
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In any event it is on the record the prosecution lied of its existence and the State on
my first appeal furthered this lie. See supra at 10. Contrary to the State's "unfortunate"
position that crippled my defense and made the State's case look stronger than the facts
actually supported. Kyles, at 429.
Further, to bolster my position in 5 different defense areas, all denied by the State
of their existence, are found in the medical examiner's report and supported in the other
parts of the record are the following;
A. The syringes in the victims truck were never tested, some of which had liquid
residue in them;
B. The black substance (27 grams) were never tested;
C. There were old and fresh needle marks in the victims right and left arms (see
exhibit 3, M.E. report);
D. The decedent tested positive for consumption of amphetamine and
methamphetamine (see exhibit 3, Tox. Report);
E. (and most striking) The right and left hands were GSR tested, bagged and the
test results were placed into evidence (see page 2 M.E. report exhibit 3.)
These lies, nondisclosures and withholding of critical exculpatory evidence had a
substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict, my due process and fair trial rights,
my 19affective counsel rights and effectively denied my effective review of the conviction
on my first appeal of right. See Brecht, Kyles, Evitts, Walker, supra.
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There is a strong probability, had all this been disclosed to the defense jury, and
court, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. This was material
evidence and constitutional error has resulted. This was not only material to affirmative
defenses but went to the heart of the fact finding process delineated by Winship, 397 U.S.
358-64 (1970), and was determinative to guilt, innocence or lesser degree of punishment.
United States v. Baglev, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 685 (1985).
Because of the nature of the withheld evidence, because case was close, the
suppressed evidence put key testimony in doubt, United States v. Arnold, 117 F.3d 1308,
1318(11 Cir 1997), violation when prosecution deliberately suppresses evidence
corroborating defense. United States v. Uldechukwu, 11 F.3d 1101, 1106 (1 st Cir. 1993);
The judicial inquiry must focus on the effect on my rights not prosecutor's intentions,
Brown v. Borg, 951 F2d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1991); because, government's bad faith
attempt to suppress (exculpatory or material) evidence indicates that such may be
material. United States v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305, 1311+ n.4 (7th Cir. 1986).
It is apparent that the district court erroneously concluded that the cumulative
impact that the suppress/withheld evidence had on my rights as well as trial. The
assessment was wholly improper because a prudent judge should have grave doubt or
virtual equipoise he should have found in my favor. Oneal at 435-36, supra at 3.
It is conclusively proven in the record my intent was not to kill, this being
inferred by the fact I brought NO weapon to the scene, see Bisner, 2001 Utah 99 TJ 4,1
was intoxicated, 1 3 , the decedent came with weapons, ^f 6 (the rest of the paragraph is
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contrary to the clearly established record which proceeds); he has the propensity to
violence, had a 31" chain, used drugs which creates extreme paranoia and hostility, had
been ingesting drugs and all other inferences and arguments herein. Supra at 13-18. (See
exhibits 3,4.)
Therefore all facts necessary to constitute both offenses I was charged with most
emphatically are not proven beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury was never
presented with ALL facts necessary to properly determine whether I was guilty as
charged, of a lesser crime or factually or legally innocent under the force in defense of
person. § 76-2-402. See § 76-1-501 (1999), § 76-1-503 (1999), § 77-17-1 (1999), § 7717-3(1999), §77-17-10(1999).
Further Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure rule 16(a)(l-5), (b), was violated
continually by the state as well as my due process, fair trial and equal protection rights
under both state and federal constitutions.
The autopsy, Final Pathological Diagnosis and Toxicology reports were available
by February 5, 1999, well before they were requested. It cannot be said that the State
didn't know of their existence but they intentionally suppressed their existence to gain a
tactical 21advantage over me at my trial. The autopsy was done on January 6, 1999
witnessed by two detectives who are arms of the prosecution. At that time they knew of
the illegal drug consumption, needle marks and GSR results which were "submitted as
evidence," but again, denied twice when requested.

20

Had the GSR test been negative, the State most assuredly would have used the
negativity to bolster their case but since the decedent shot first at me, and since then was
something, some result, submitted as evidence, since the prosecution lied of its presence
and of the GSR test on two written occasions it must have been positive, then beneficial
and material to my defense. See Jackson, supra at 19.
The same with the toxicology reports and testing of the unknown substance and
syringes. Supra at 13, 14. All conclusively point to the decedent being the aggressor, him
pulling the rifle and me having to defend my life. That is pure hell for an 18 year old.
How would this court respond?
This is the facts. When we got out of our vehicle, Darby stepped out from behind
the door of his truck holding the assault rifle. When Dustin Symes saw the gun he
grabbed a bat from out of the cab. Darby yelled that he was going to kill all of us so we
all ran toward him because we had nowhere else to go.
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Dustin hit Darby with the bat

and Justin and Derrick were wrestling or hitting him. Then Justin, Derrick and Dustin all
ran back towards their truck leaving Darby and I still standing there. I saw Darby still had
the gun so we began to fight over it and as this was happening the gun went off two or
three times, something like that. Darby finally let go and jumped into his truck. As he did
this I took cover behind his truck. I didn't know if he had another gun in the truck nor did
I know if any rounds were left in the rifle. I, as he started to drive off, fired a couple
rounds trying to scare him off because I didn't know if he was coming back after me.

21

From the time the others left to this point was a few seconds. I didn't know what
was going to happen next or if he had another weapon so I took off running thinking I
may have scared him enough so I could get away. I didn't know Darby was dead until the
police told me he was. I did not mean to shoot him, I only meant to diffuse the situation
or to rob him. There was no intent on my part and this is proven from the testimony of my
co-defendants and in other parts of the record and by the fact I did not bring a weapon at
all to the scene.
If I would have took 6 shots at Darby's truck myself, the truck being no more
than 20 feet away I if having the intent to kill, could have hit him with the first shot.
Assault rifles are extremely accurate. But testimony conclusively proves there were 2 sets
of 2 or three shots with a gap in between each set. The first set was over the scuffle over
the rifle and the second was when I tried to scare him away. There were only 2 holes in
the truck owned by Darby.
I did not intend to commit any crime against Darby. I never wanted to fight, shoot
or be accused of robbing him, which I didn't rob him. I still grieve over his death today
because I didn't want any harm to happen to him.
Now looking at the previous failures of prosecution's disclosures, the prosecution
under rule 16(a)(4) he further failed in disclosing evidence which negates the guilt,
mitigates guilt or degree of offense or reduce punishment, which is part of his continuing
duty to disclose as well as his duty under due process to make disclosure even if no
specific request has been make. See Agurs at 106, 110-113, also n22.
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The relevant material the prosecution omitted that mitigated guilt, punishment and
that reduce punishment are the uncontroverted facts as listed 24below that is in the record
(and I also realize that this is partly defense counsel's error also but the prosecutor also
has a due process duty to ensure my trial if fair under Winship, Agurs, and Bagley),
1. There were, on either side, no expert witness testimony to deal with these
issues.
a) The grouping of the spent casings found on the ground at the crime scene a
pile of 2 or 3 in 2 different places would have indicated and supported the
claim he shot at me first and I acted in self defense;
b) That there were two different sets of shots as indicated in testimony of the
State's witnesses. See [?] at Tf 7 (although the statement the Supreme Court
relied on is mistaken it never the less shows that it is known that two sets of
shots were fired. (See exhibit 1));
c) Evidence conclusively proved that there were wild shots taken which
supported a struggle between Darby and I and this is evidenced by 2 bullet
holds in the roof of a building this [is] conclusive because the only shots
that were fired in the whole incident were those fired by Darby and I;
d) That testimony from ballistics expert was needed also for showing that there
were only 2 bullet holes in the truck and that the bullet that had struck
Darby was a 25ricochet which would have proven that I did not intend to kill
him, only scare him, because I did not know whether he had another gun in
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the truck or whether he was going to try to run over me with the truck (see
exhibit 6);
e) Evidence supported that I was paranoid because of my drug abuse
(voluntary intoxication, see § 76-2-306 (1999)), whether I was in the "fight
or flight" mental state because of the attending circumstances and whether I
could actually form the intent or whether I was actually reckless or
operating under extreme emotional disturbance and the fact I kept the
weapon (because I didn't know he was shot much less dead) was to keep
him from overtaking me and shooting me, not to rob him as accused;
f) Medical testimony of the contusions on co-defendants were products of
being hit by Darby or the 31" chain, that had metal attachments on the end,
which would have shown him to be the aggressor and that by the fact he had
the metal attachments on the end of the chain would show his intent and
propensity to violence. (See exhibit 7.)
g) Expert testimony because the facts existed, of how both Darby and mental
states were altered by drug abuse and how that inhibited my ability to think
rationally since the circumstances were the way they were and my
codefendants ran away leaving me alone with Darby;
h) And since all this happened so quick proved it was not a product of preplanning since I did not bring any weapons would show self defense and
also lack of intent because I didn't have the time to form the necessary
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intent to commit murder or robbery because I lacked clairvoyant skills
necessary to know that Darby was brining the rifle and chain, that he was
going to shoot at me, attack me and that my co-defendants were going to run
and leave me there;
i) If you also note from the Supreme Court's opinion atfflf6 and 7 that codefendants Symes and Koontz were the initial aggressors of the group I was
with, not me and it was Symes that had and threw the bat at Darby, not me
which conclusively proves I did not go to this meeting with the intent to
hurt Darby nor was it me who arranged the meeting it was Koontz and
Symes after Darby returned their 27call at about 2:00 a.m. on January 6,
1999 and the meeting, as stated by the Supreme Court in ^ 3 of the opinion
of case #20000026 was "because of the late nature of the call" which
ended up at the meeting at the strip mall to settle that dispute, that did not
involve me so this would have disproved my intent to kill him and my
involvement because of the alleged drug debt. The fight was over the late
nature of the calls a dispute originally involving Koontz and Symes;
j) The prosecution presented an improper legal argument and misled the jury
by proffering that the fight was over a drug debt and not over the correct
issue viz, the late nature of the phone call, which improperly stated the
evidence and facts which denied due process and a fair trial;
k) Lastly, the statement of Darby's wife conclusively proves I was not
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concerned over the money, the purported $350.00, he owed for drugs but
evidence proves that the fight was over the late phone call initiated by the
co-defendants, not me, and the prosecution failed to explain this which
further misled the jury. (Exhibit 8.)
The prosecutor's role transcends that of an adversary, because acting as a
representative of a sovereign has an obligation, not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done. Banks, 1517 nl9.
In this case there were two specific requests for discovery made which were not
folly disclosed or else lied about as stated previously. The prosecution has the duty to
disclose irregardless if a request is made if it is exculpatory evidence or mitigates the
crime, degree of crime, or punishment, Banks, 1517; Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(4), and that
is continuous duty. Rule 16(b).
Moreover give the prosecutor's unique role in our justice system he must resolve
close cases and doubtful questions in favor of disclosure, Banks, id., because the
exculpatory nature of particular evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the
entire record is complete. Id,, Aqurs at 108. The prosecutor must exercise this discretion
carefully because he alone can only know what is not disclosed therefore it is him alone
that the court assigns the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net effect of all
such evidence and make disclosure when the point of "reasonable probability" is reached.
Banks, id. 1517 (citations omitted). Therefore the conclusion he abused his disclosure
obligation in this case cannot be ignored.
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In reviewing the materiality of the withheld evidence singularly but look to
cumulative impact and its utility to the defense as well as its potentially damaging
impact to the prosecution's case and this must be reviewed in view of the entire record to
see if
the "omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist." Banks, at
1518 (citations omitted). This must be answered in the affirmative.
What might be considered insignificant evidence in a strong case might suffice to
disturb an already questionable verdict. Banks, id. at 1518.
This case is not a close case. Had the State not withheld the favorable evidence the
jury would have not found me guilty as charged. The withheld evidence, even without
defense errors discussed later, made the State's case looks stronger than the full facts
would suggest and conveniently enough, the evidence I needed to support my self defense
argument. Knoll, id. 214.
This Court must realize that this evidence if the hands of competent defense
counsel could be used to "uncover other leads and defense theories." Banks, Id. 1519.
Thus you may draw reasonable inferences as to that those other lines of defense may have
been. Id.
Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that had it been
disclosed to the defense that result of the proceedings would have been different. This is a
probability "sufficient to undermine your confidence in the outcome." Banks 1518. This
Court's confidence in this case should be undermined.
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Sub-Argument A (cont): "Ineffective counsel, trial, and appellate ."
Now joining these two arguments together it is reasonable to say that defense
counsel on some of these propositions should have reasonably known or did in fact know
of the prosecution's possession of these pieces of evidence. However the prosecutor's
obligation to turn over evidence in the first instance stands independent of the defendant's
knowledge, period. Banks, id. 1517.
And, I also present that appellate counsel failed to raise the disclosure issue as I
have here and made it know to him, thus he was ineffective for his failure to raise
ineffective trial counsel as I ask and the disclosure issue fully on direct appeal because
trial counsel, if the court states or rules that the prosecution did not withhold the evidence
(how a court could say that in light of the facts and case law I do not know) then I assert
that trial counsel was ineffective in using it in my defense and appellate counsel was
ineffective in its failure to raise these issues. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394
(1985); Banks, id. 1515 (the citations omitted).
These issues and facts were "dead bang winners" intentionally left out by appellate
counsel because of his conflict of interest which is evidenced by trial counsel's motion to
withdraw based on a conflict of interest and they recommended a specific attorney, a
friend or friends, of which the court carelessly appointed. See Banks, id. 31at 1515 and
Osborn 614-15, Holland 361-62. The reason for this is because the State and the
defendant's positions are necessarily in opposition, Osborn at 629, Holland at 360 , and
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because the gravity of the charge may affect what a reasonably competently acting
attorney may do. Osborn at 626. See Banks, id. at 1519.
The Tenth Circuit has never defined "dead bang winner" with precision but it
would be as they concluded, an issue which is obvious from the trial record and one
which probably would have resulted in a reversal on appeal. Banks, id. 1515 n. 13. This
court cannot hold me responsible for counsels' errors. I tried to get both trial and
appellate counsels to do their ethical obligations but neither had undivided loyalty and
deprived me of my counsel, fair trial and due process rights under the 6 and 14
amendments as well as Article 1 § 7, 12 rights. See United States v. Miskinis, 966 F.2d
1263 (9th Cir. 1992).
The errors of trial counsel are as follows (as associated with prosecution errors):
1. Failure to file necessary pre-trial motions for specific court orders to compel the
prosecution to produce
A. GSR Test results,
B. Results of Toxicology reports,
C. Statement from Darby's wife,
D. Ballistics expert's testimony,
E. Grouping of shell casings evidence,
F. Expert testimony of ricochet of bullet,
G. Challenging credibility's of the State's witness Mr. Drury who witnessed
the crime from over 150 yards away at night,
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H.

Failure to conduct tests on the syringes and unidentified substance in
possession of victim to establish drug abuse and his illegal activity,

I. Expert testimony of the effects of Darby's and my drug consumption, DNA
test, etc.,
J. Testimony and admission to the jury on the 31" chain with metal ends and
on the SKS rifle to prove Darby's propensity to violence along with his
wife's statement of Darby's violent behavior, always carried weapons
everywhere he went,
K. Failure to move for state appropriated expert witnesses,
L. Failure to use the results of the autopsy report, toxicology reports, etc. to
destroy the prosecution's presentation of the decedent, ie. needle marks,
etc.,
M. Failed to marshal all evidence that proved my lack of intent for both
offenses and which would have bolstered my self defense or lesser included
offense theory, .
N. Failed to present evidence found in victim's possession to the jury,
0. Failed to properly pursue issues dealing with the plea agreements of my codefendants Koontz, Pearson, and Symes because the Supreme Court
practically assigned this error to counsel, not a Brady issue as counsel
presented, that this further violated my confrontation rights as well as
discovery rights under rule 16(a),
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P. Counsel failed to argue that the evidence of prior bad acts on the drug sale
was not the issue that 33caused the meeting, it was my co-defendants
Koontz'
and Symes' argument with Darby over the late nature of the calls, NOT
anything to do with me,
Q. Counsel failed to present Darbys' wife's statement that proved that I could
care less about the drug debt because I was more concerned about Darby
taking care of his newborn baby and wife. I knew he was having financial
difficulty. This disproved any intent to harm Darby but showed my
compassion to him and the element of surprise when he attacked violently
like he did. This bolstered my self defense theory,
R. Counsel wholly failed to present any evidence as afore mentioned - the
evidentiary facts and evidence that would have drew reasonable doubt,
S. These issues were critical and material to guilt or innocence determinations
by the jury,
T. Failed to move, object or argue mistrial based on his experience that the
GSR test, autopsy, and toxicology reports were being withheld, lied about
as to their existence and because that interfered with his loyalty and duties
to his client because he could not properly investigate or prepare a defense,
U. Failed to move for disqualification in the district court as he did in the
Supreme Court based 34on his obvious conflict of interest,
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V. Failed to properly present and argue that the decedent toxicology report
showed positive for high levels of methamphetamine and amphetamine and
its psychological effect, ie. paranoia, propensity to violence, etc.,
W. Failed to properly present that I was NOT the aggressor and have an expert
witness describe the effects of my drug abuse and the "fight or flight"
theory to help offer evidence of my self defense theory, lack of intent,
mental state, etc.,
X. Failed to properly present that there were 2 sets of shots, evidence of the
wild nature of the shots, supra 24-28, the contusions on myself and codefendants evidencing the existence of a fight and it should be recognized
that all 4 of us had contusions, etc., that would either mean Darby was a
tough individual to beat on 4 individuals or he did indeed use a weapon
against us,
Y. All evidence pointed to the fact that this was a surprise, not a pre-planned
adventure as the State makes it out to be, counsel failed to present this as
such. See supra 26, 27 H-K,
Z. Any other error this court could assign to counsel that has been raised
herein or that the court sees in the record, post judgment 35motions and
failure to file such, etc.
Appellate counsel failed on appeal to raise the following issues of which I wrote
the court by letter, motions, etc. and tried to present:
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A. That trial counsel was ineffective,
B. Failed to move for disqualification based on conflict of interest because
they were friends with trial counsel (and this is obvious because trial
counsel specifically requested their appointment which was improperly or
misleadingly granted) and this presented a conflict with properly raising and
or presenting issues on appeal,
C. Counsel failed to move for a 23B remand if he reasonably concluded that
there was not enough evidence in the record to present an ineffective
counsel issue not to just completely ignore it because they were his friends,
D. Counsel failed to properly present the issues he raised on appeal which is
evidenced in the Supreme Court's opinion at ^f 35 through 39 disclosure of
Lyman agreement; failed to properly attribute the Koontz, Symes, Pearson
plea agreements to trial counsel error instead of the Brady presentation as
he done,
E. Failed to properly pursue rule 16 discovery issues and confrontation issues
as he should have. (See n.3 exhibit 1)
F. Raised a search and seizure that had no basis in law and this could have
been determined with minimum effort 36but substituted it for the "dead
bang" winner counsel issue as I specifically ask for repeatedly to him and
the Supreme Court; improperly raised the prior bad acts issue when the
issue didn't deal with drug debt as alleged but was ineffective counsel
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because evidence conclusively proved the fight was over late phone calls
not the alleged drug debt and this is and this is conclusively proven in the
record; (this was a misstatement of evidence that helped confuse the jury,
had they knew that the meeting surrounded the late nature of the phone calls
they could have reasonably concluded that I didn't have the intent to kill
Darby because the meeting didn't surround me or my issues and this could
have supported my self defense claim by the facts previously raised.); That,
that evidence should have been excluded and the relevant nature of the late
nature of the phone call should have been presented as the co-defendants'
motive showing I had no motive to harm Darby; the manslaughter
instruction argument was incorrectly presented and the way it was presented
was not necessarily the issue with it where counsel should have presented
that the attending circumstances merited conviction for manslaughter not
'in

that the language was confusing. This further proves that counsel didn't
put forth reasonable effort in the proper research of the issues but
intentionally tried to steer them away from having to assign any error to trial
counsel, his friends who recommended him,
G. The merger argument on appeal relying on Shaffer as its basis was
completely inappropriate from the case at hand, McCovey, itself being
distinguishable from this case but the proper presentation would have been
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a single criminal episode argument under §76-1-401 and §76-1-402(1) not
§ (3) as presented by counsel,
H. Counsel further failed to raise the other issues dealing with non-disclosure
evident in the record and as I ask because this would have necessarily
challenged the competency of those who requested that he be appointed,
I. Further I raised the issue that it was my belief from information I obtained
from another attorney that the judge and prosecutor used to prosecute
together and that I believed this should be investigated and dealt with
accordingly, that this should have been known also by trial counsel but to
all concerned, was ignored,
J. I ask counsel to step down because of conflict of interest then lack of
willingness to become "involved" in my case, identify with my issues and
their failure to investigate and prepare a proper defense on my appeal.
These issues not only present a potential conflict as admitted by trial counsel but
also prove that the fundamental fairness of my trial was affected by counsels' failure to
investigate, prepare defenses and properly argue my position in both courts. See Banks,
Osborn, Classon, and Holland, supra.
Counsel failed to object to many instances of impropriety and failed as alleged
herein to perform his ethical and constitutional duties. The first part of the Strickland test
has been met. There was no possible explanation or tactical reasons for these decisions by
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either counsel and most of these issues would have been dealt with outside the presence
of the jury. State v. Maestas, 984 P2d 376, 381 (Utah 1999).
The next issue is the prejudice component where the reviewing court must
examine the merits of the underlying claims. Banks, id. at 1516.
All claims have a basis in state, federal, constitutional and statutory law. See §7732 et. seq. These issues in part are either attributable to prosecution nondisclosure or
ineffective trial and appellate counsel but both bottom on bedrock fundamental due
process issues and fundamental fairness 39no matter how the error is assigned. Further a
reviewing court examines the merits of the omitted issues on appeal, Banks 1515, and
these issues under Banks were "dead bang winners" or errors that would have resulted in
reversal on appeal. Id. n. 13. This court should reverse or vacate the convictions and
order a new trial.
The Habeas court in determining that the petition was not frivolous on its face and
in ordering response from the State as well as noting the complexity of the issues should
have appointed counsel under § 78-35a-109(l)(2) because by all rights the court should
have granted relief under Olano and Oneal; Brecht, supra, because any reasonable judge
should have had doubt as to the fairness of the conviction looking at the structural error of
the trial and first appeal.
Sub-Argument C: "The Supreme Court erred in appointing counsel that was
recommended by trial counsel who admittedly had a conflict on interest."
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Because of my lack of ability to research this issue the only case I can find
factually similar is Osborn v. Shillinger, supra. The Supreme Court by appointing the
recommended counsel violated my due process and equal protection rights under Evitts v.
Lucey, supra to an effective first appeal of right because counsel had a self imposed
conflict 40which is evident because they wholly failed to attribute any error no matter how
blatant, to trial counsel. The record was replete with instances or trial counsel's failure to
investigate, prepare defenses, prepare for trial, in filing pre-trial and post-trial motions,
lack of loyalty, irrational decisions with no tactical basis and counsel failed to identify
with his client or take responsibility for his cause as did appellate counsel.
The court will review ineffective counsel claims first time on appeal when the
record is complete and meets the standards outlined in case law. Maestas at 378. See
Osborn, id. 614-15. Because of this just as my trial, my first appeal did not take an
adversarial stance. Cronic, id. at 656-659; Osborn 626-629. Further the gravity of the
charge may affect what reasonably competent attorney would be expected to do. Cronic
666; Osborn, id- 626 n.12. It should have been noted by the court that my case is similar
to Osborn, Holland, and Banks in that my counsel both at trial and on appeal by their
actions have effectively joined the State in an effort to obtain a conviction because the
evidence presented and/or withheld most assuredly disproves murder, and wholly
disproves the aggravated robbery because by the facts of the 41case, some then unknown
to me, you cannot rob a deceased individual and since, by the facts of the case he was
dead before I, in a panic, took off with the rifle in an attempt to keep him from getting it
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if he was to run over me with his truck, I cannot by guilty of that crime, maybe theft but
not aggravated robbery. The facts prove this. Since I didn't know how many shells were
left in the rifle or if he had another one or if he was going to try to run over me, I kept the
weapon only with the intent to keep him from recovering it to shoot me.
Because of appellate counsel's friendship and obvious conflict which had to be
present with me trying to get them disqualified, my own pro se motions filed in the
Supreme Court, etc. (see exhibit 5), it is conclusive by these documents and the opinion in
exhibit 1 of #20000026 that counsel's tactical decisions on issues on appeal were not
made after adequate investigation or reasoned judgment and these facts prove
conclusively that counsel completely failed to investigate the other plausible lines of
defense and was inadequately prepared to effectively present the tactical defenses on
appeal that he chose and that he intentionally omitted "dead band winners" because he
would have necessarily had to challenge the competency of those who 42requested
specifically his appointment on appeal. Both counsels must present conflicting evidence
to the court not judge it himself. Nix, supra, id. at 157. An attorney who adopts the role
of a judge and jury to determine the facts pose a danger of depriving their clients of the
zealous and loyal advocacy required by the sixth amendment. Id., Osbom at 628. In this
case neither counsel through the exercise of skill and judgment and diligence fulfilled
their duties to make reasonable investigations or to properly determine that such
investigations were not necessary. Stickland at 691. There was no adversarial character in
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either proceeding and both counsel abandoned their duty of loyalty and effectively joined
the State in an effort to obtain a conviction. Osborn at 629.
The trial counsel in their misleading the Supreme Court in appointing appellate
counsel allowed that court to further the conflict that deprived me of an effective first
appeal of right. Evitts at 402-405. In knowing that the court didn't do that (intentionally)
(error) should be assigned to the State which has affirmative duty to know the law of
their state and law is defined in § 78-27-19 as opinions of appellate courts, etc. State v.
Patience, 944 P2d 381, 388 (Utah App. 1997).
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ARGUMENT 2: "The proceedings before all courts involved were replete with

instances of plain rule 30(a) and prejudicial error which resulted in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice."
Not only looking at the errors involved, this case involves exceptional
circumstances that require the setting aside of legal principles usually asserted by the
State and courts because my constitutional, statutory, procedural protections as well as the
court decisions cited herein should (in a properly run administration of justice) be more
important.
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure rule 10(f) allows for waiver for pro se
parties which works in concert with "liberal construction" mandated by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Haines, supra at

thereby allowing also, adoption by reference and exhibits of

any pleading to be a part of proceeding at all stages, see rule 10(c). The waiving of this
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rule does not have to be made by special request but by the "clerk or the court", thereby
allowing liberal construction by rule as mandated by courts all over.
Since a petition is a civil proceeding the rule applied in my case to the habeas court
as well as to the Supreme Court in case #20000026 by virtue of Utah R. Civ. P. rule 81(e)
because there was no applicable appellate rule to cover my desperate attempts to make the
court aware of my conflict with counsel and other issues.
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See Utah R. App. P. rule 1(a)

for support of the civil rules apply to appeals before Utah appellate courts. I therefore
assert that position then as well as now, how these errors are viewed are determined by
the court. Under State v. Knight 734 P2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987) the Utah Supreme Court
explained that rule 30(a) error under the Utah R. Crim. P. is concluded by if there is a
reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would have been had had the error
never happened. Such is the case here in several areas raised herein.
Since these types of cases are highly fact sensitive the record of this case does not
clearly support the verdict of guilty on either charge.,especially in light of the issues
presented supra at 6-42 and their exhibits.
In "marshalling the evidence" as requirement ordered by This Court in State v.
Moore, 802 P.2d at 738 when reviewing sufficiency of evidence it cannot be said that had
the jury been able to review the evidence of the GSR test, toxicology report, autopsy
report and syringes and was able to see test results of the black substance or all the
casings, etc., in and on the victim as well as the needle marks in both arms, they would
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have still found me guilty as charged or that I acted in self defense or of a lesser included
offense.
Without proper or all evidence to review, a jury cannot properly conclude guilt on
all facts necessary to constitute 45the offenses I was charged with under the Winship
standard or properly assess witness credibility or make any proper determination when
critical evidence is withheld or suppressed or not properly proffered. This is rule 30(a)
error as well as plain error on part of the prosecutor and the court because the court knew
what we were trying to discover, the habeas court saw the evidence. United States v.
Clarke, 227 F.3d 874,884 (7th cir. 2000), it was plain under current law, United States v.
Villareal 253 F.3d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 2000); Olano at 734 (see United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725 (1993)) and it is enough for the error to be "plain" at the time of appellate
consideration. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465 (1997) also allows for plain
error review even if I failed to assert a right. Johnson 465.
The record as a whole must be reviewed to determine is prosecutor's misconduct
denied defendant a fair trial, Clarke at 884 supra, and was derelict in attempting it. United
States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 115 (2nd Cir. 2000); United States v. Mendez, 117 F.3d
480, 485 (11th Cir. 1997) (even absent my objection); Deviation form a legal rule is error
unless it is waived. Olano, 732-33, supra. See United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157,
159-60 (1936). There's been no waiver.
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An error exists that is "clear and obvious" when an element of the offense is not
met, see United States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674, 682 (1 st Cir. 2000); Olano at 732-33;
Winship, supra, which most emphatically is the case here on both offenses.
Therefore as the Utah Supreme Court explained in State v. Holgate, 10 P3d 346,
350 (Utah 2000) that 46in a plain error review there is a 3 part test that must be followed:
(i) an error exists, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the [trial] court, (iii) the error
must be harmful i.e., absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant or as phrased in Dunn, 850 P.2d 1208-09, or that "our
confidence in the verdict is undermined."
Most assuredly this court, with the issues presented, should have their confidence
in the verdict undermined. I also would like to remind the court that not only do I present
that the court should liberally construe this complex case under the Haines standard,
supra, but also that under Utah Rules of Evidence rule 103(d) which states:
"Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to
the attention of the court."
This further does in fact work in concert with Utah R. Crim. P. rule 30(a) which
similarly states:
"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not
affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded."
Lastly, these further go hand in hand taking in consideration the "exceptional
circumstances" doctrine this court defined in State v. Archambeau, (passim) (Utah App.
19) to deal with procedural anomalies listed herein, whether committed by the court,
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counsel or prosecution which affected my substantial or procedural rights.
Further this court can review trial court rulings for plain error even absent
objection. State v. Eldridge, 713 P2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989).
The purpose of a Petition for Extraordinary Relief is to challenge the lawfulness of
physical restraint. Not infrequently the fairness of a conviction turns on facts that are not,
nor could they be, in the record and therefore could not be relied upon on direct appeal.
Many of the facts alleged herein fall into that category and others attributable to counsels
or prosecution.
This is why an evidentiary hearing was so crucial in this proceeding because I was
convicted in violation of principles of fundamental fairness. Therefore as directed in
Julian at 254, the court (even though in the context of the limitations argument) stated that
"if a proper showing is made . .. can never justify continued imprisonment of one who
has been deprived of fundamental rights regardless of how difficult it may be for the state
to re-prosecute." The court said also that "a court should grant relief if the petitioner
establishes that he or she has been deprived of due process of law" or that "it would be
unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction." Brown, id. 969; Julian at 254. Such is
the case here.
Further the writ is the most important of all judicial tools for the prosecution of
individual liberty. Julian 253.
48

The Hurst court at 1036 further stated procedural default is not always

determinative of collateral attack on a conviction where it is alleged that the trial was not
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conducted within the bounds of basic harmony of fairness or with constitutional
standards. See Hurst 1036 n. 6. The re-litigated issues herein pass the "unusual
circumstances" or "good cause" standards of Hurst at 1037 based on the facts stated
herein. See Hurst, id. at 1035.
Also this court in Classon and the Hurst court at 1037 n. 10 notes that, as with this
case, that even if due process is not necessarily implemented "fundamental fairness" is
and may nevertheless raise a fair question as to whether a new trial should be granted, as
it should in this case. No matter which way you look at it, this case insults the integrity of
the judicial process that is supposed to provide procedures that only convict when every
fact necessary to constitute the offenses charged are proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
This is not the case here. Not every element in the definition of the offense has been
constitutionally proven for the reasons set forth herein. Patterson at 210.
With the fundamental fairness of this conviction brought into question This Court
should grant relief in the interest of at least fundamental fairness.
49

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION

Oral argument will be material in the decision of this case as will be a written
opinion to guide the lower courts in deciding future matters involving like or similar
issues.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully requested that this court reverse, vacate or order a new fair trial in
this matter or in the alternative, set aside the convictions and direct a judgment for
manslaughter or negligent homicide as requested pursuant to § 76-1-402(5) and State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) and vacate the aggravated robbery conviction as there
is no legal basis for this, and vacate the order of the habeas court.
It is further requested that this court retain jurisdiction as it did in State v. Gibbons,
740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). Any other relief deemed just and proper or issue a common
law writ of certiorari.
Dated this 8th Day of December 2003.
RUSSELL E. BISNER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed postage prepaid to:
Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 841140854 on this 8th day of December 2003.
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